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Abstract
In debates on the metaphysics of resurrection, it seems that philosophical theology is
often arguing on the wrong fronts. While some philosophers and theologians spend their time
arguing the feasibility of a person’s bodily numerical identity at resurrection, whether or not a
human being can exist apart from their body, or whether the resurrection is physical at all
(among many other points of view) this thesis seeks to argue a more foundational issue: God’s
eternal/atemporal existence and how it affects the resurrection of mankind. If it can be shown
that God’s eternal/atemporal existence allows for a person to experience simultaneity in their
death and future resurrection, then physical resurrection can be affirmed along with numerical
identity between the “body sown” and “body raised,” and further arguments concerning a
possible disembodied existence can be declared irrelevant (among other ramifications).
Motivated by two vexing passages of Scripture, Matthew 22:29-33 and Luke 23:43, this
thesis wishes to provide a philosophical hermeneutic to these passages while also affirming
orthodox Christian theology in its belief of a physical resurrection at the eschaton and that being
physically resurrected is far better than not being physically resurrected. I will do so by (1) using
Thomas Aquinas’ theory of eternity and other modes of existence to account for a specific kind
of simultaneity, (2) defending the Thomistic account of eternity and his other modes of
existence, and (3) explaining how it is the case that, given God’s eternal mode of existence, a
human being’s (particularly a Christian human being) death and future resurrection occur
simultaneously. Hence, the theory to be so argued is termed “Simultaneous Resurrection.”
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And as for the resurrection of the dead, have you not read what was said to you by God:
‘I am the God of Abraham, and the God of Isaac, and the God of Jacob’?
He is not the God of the dead, but of the living.
And when the crowd heard it, they were astonished at his teaching.
Matthew 22:31-33
Now he is not God of the dead, but of the living, for all live to Him.
Luke 20:38
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CHAPTER ONE
Introduction

In philosophical theology there are several ongoing debates with regard to the Christian
doctrine of the resurrection of the dead; two of the more notable debates focus on the type of
resurrection that will happen (e.g. will the resurrection produce physical bodies or spiritual
bodies?) and if resurrection is even possible (e.g. how is it possible for God to resurrect Jones at
time t1 if Jones has ceased to exist at time t?).1 Both of these questions center on certain aspects
to the metaphysics of resurrection; of which, there are a number of current studies,2 including
those that cover such issues as whether or not resurrection bodies will be physical, whether or
not there is a “time gap” between consciousness at death and at new life, and whether a body can
return from oblivion. With respect to the arguments inside the doctrine of resurrection, it is
important to note that there must be satisfactory defense given of both the concept of physical
resurrection of the body and of the notion that resurrection is something better than nonresurrection. In other words, there should be a reason that God is going to resurrect human
beings rather than not resurrect them. While there are plenty of arguments discussing the
necessity of either a physicalist view or substance-dualist view of the human person in response
1

The examples given are by no means an exhaustion of the possible questions with respect to the manner of
resurrection or its possibility.
2

In the bibliography see Trenton Merricks’s contribution, “The Resurrection of the Body and the Life
Everlasting,” in Reason for the Hope Within edited by Michael J. Murray (Grand Rapids, MI: W.B. Eerdmans, 1999),
261-286, Christina Van Dyke’s “Human Identity, Immanent Causal Relations, and the Principle of Non-repeatability:
Thomas Aquinas on the Bodily Resurrection,” and Lynne Rudder Baker’s “The Metaphysics of Resurrection” to
name a few.
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to how the resurrection “works,” my aim will not be to argue for a particular construct of the
human person, but rather to show that a discussion on the philosophy of time is necessary,
particularly with respect to God’s atemporal existence, to get to a more grounding metaphysical
concern in the doctrine of physical resurrection and greatly influence, and possibly solve, an ageold question: “where does one go when they die?”3
Throughout this paper I will simply assume a Thomistic view of the human being: a
human being necessarily is the composite of form (the soul) and matter (the body).4 This is a
dualist approach, but a dualist approach that affirms that a human is only a human when the two
“parts” are combined. There is no human being without a body as there is no human being
without a soul. In this paper I will not make an argument for what the human being is; rather, I
will show that if Thomas’s view of the human being is correct, there is a plausible way to affirm
the resurrection of the dead without thereby also affirming that, between a human being’s death
and resurrection, the human being ceases to exist as a human being.
The Thomistic (i.e. composite dualist account) view is taken because, if a strict substance
dualism5 is correct, and it is the case that a disembodied soul can interact with God

3

One such other question might be: “Where exactly is the incarnate Jesus now?” If He is still incarnate, one
would assume that he has location. If He has location, what location is it? If He does not have location, where is
His body? How does a spatial body, such as Christ’s incarnate body, lack location? Does Christ not exist as
incarnate after his ascension? If He does not, where did He dump His body? Scripture seems to indicate that
Christ ascended as incarnate, so His body must have ascended somewhere. Is the answer, Heaven? What does
“Heaven” mean other than “the resurrected world?” This paper should provide a cogent answer to this problem.
4

Saint Thomas Aquinas, The Summa Theologica. Vol. 2, in Great books of the Western World, no. 20. Edited by
Robert Maynard Hutchins, translated by Fathers of the English Dominican Province (Chicago, IL: Encyclopedia
Britannica, Inc., 1952), 381-387; henceforward “ST2.” This is not to say that the matter is at all settled with respect
to arguments for and against the various forms of substance-dualism; rather, this project simply is an aid to
Christians who would hold the Thomistic view (or one very close to it).
5

By “strict dualist” I mean here a dualist who affirms that the human person is more defined by their immaterial
soul rather than their body. I have in mind a more Platonic or Cartesian view of the human person.
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meaningfully6 and can exist at death in a paradisiacal state, then it seems to me that problems
lurk with respect to the reasons for the resurrection.7 As Merricks says of the strict substance
dualist: “…one thing is certain: The dualist cannot say that resurrection is necessary for eternal
life. After all, Christian dualists [in the strict, non-Thomistic way] often claim that an advantage
of their theory – even the advantage of their theory – is that it allows humans to live on after
death but before the general resurrection.”8 It would not make any sense, then, to say that life
after death occurs before resurrection and that life after death also requires resurrection.9 I take
it what Merricks means by “life after death” (LAD) is:
(LAD): The sort of paradisiacal state in which life is at its fullness and perfected.
The problem, of course, is that if the Thomistic account is true, and human beings are only
human beings when embodied, then on a position that holds to an intermediary state, the time
between death and resurrection constitutes a time in which human beings are no longer human
beings, but something else. If this is true, then Jesus would not have been telling the robber the
truth in Luke 23:43 when He said, “Truly, I say to you, today you will be with me in Paradise.”10
Indeed it would not have been the robber with Christ in Paradise that day, but something (or
someone) else since the robber would, in fact, not exist after he died. It seems hard to imagine
how the non-existence of the robber could constitute anything resembling Paradise or life in its
perfected fullness. Accordingly, Jesus’ statement to the robber becomes problematic in that He

6

See APPENDIX: Mystical Experience and Substance Dualism.

7

This seems to be how most substance dualist will read the account in Luke 23 where Jesus promises to the
robber on the cross next to Him that today the robber will be with Him in paradise.
8

Trenton Merricks, “The Resurrection of the Body and the Life Everlasting,” in Reason for the Hope Within,
edited by Michael J. Murray (Grand Rapids, MI: W.B. Eerdmans, 1999), 281. Insert added. Emphasis his.
9

Ibid., 281.

10

Emphasis mine.
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would have been either lying to the robber who trusted Him or else saying something to the
robber that was unintelligible.11 Further, it seems that, following Paul in 1 Corinthians 15, the
Christian indeed does want to say that resurrection is necessary for (LAD) as so defined:
“For if the dead are not raised, not even Christ has been raised. And if Christ has
not been raised, your faith is futile and you are still in your sins. Then those who
have fallen asleep in Christ have perished.”12
If the resurrection is necessary for (LAD) of a human being, and the human being is
necessarily a composite of body and soul, what does one do with death? Is a human being, Jones
for example, utterly destroyed since he vanishes from temporal existence? If so, how exactly is
it possible for God to recreate an utterly destroyed Jones? Christina Van Dyke attempts to use
Aquinas’s view of the immortality of the soul to posit that Aquinas’s view, regarding the
eventual natural return of the departed immortal soul to the material body at resurrection, allows
for immanent causal relations between the dead Jones and the resurrected Jones. If Van Dyke is
correct, then God is excused of having to recreate Jones out of whole-cloth, thus solving the
problem of identity over time.13 However, even with this proposed solution, there still seems to
be a point at which the human being ceases to exist at all. The problem, however, is that with
respect to Scripture, Jesus affirms that today the dead person (dead believing person, anyway)
will be in Paradise.14 In addition to the Luke passage mentioned, another passage of Scripture

11

See APPENDIX: (LAD) and Temporary Bodies.

12

I Corinthians 15:16-18 (English Standard Version Bible)

13

Christina Van Dyke, “Human Identity, Immanent Causal Relations, and the Principle of Non-repeatability:
Thomas Aquinas on the Bodily Resurrection,” Religious Studies 43 (2007): 388.
14

Luke 23:43 (English Standard Version Bible) - As this paper will show, while it need not be the case that Christ
is referring to a temporal “today,” it not need not thereby be the case that He is indicating a huge temporal gap or
a metaphorical indication relating to the believer’s next experience after death. Merricks argues something similar
to the latter in his Resurrection of the Body and the Life Everlasting pg. 285.
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can be used as a launching point for the argument to be discussed in this paper: Matthew 22:2933.
In Matthew 22, the Sadducees, the sect of Jews that deny the resurrection, attempt to
stump Jesus on the reality of the resurrection. In reply to their rhetorical trap, Jesus attempts to
offer proof of the resurrection by citing Exodus chapter 3 verse 6: “And he said, “I am the God
of your father, the God of Abraham, the God of Isaac, and the God of Jacob.” To which Jesus, in
Matthew 22:32, insists that God “… is not the God of the dead, but of the living.” So, it seems
that Jesus is using Exodus 3:6 as proof of the resurrection. The problem, of course, is that if
Jesus is using Exodus 3:6 to prove the resurrection, then this likely means that the people
mentioned in the passage are experiencing resurrection life. But how can this be? After all,
according to traditional Christian theism, the resurrection of the dead only happens at the end of
time.15 Is it possible that both states of affairs are true? Can it be that, in a real way, Abraham,
Isaac, and Jacob (in addition to every other dead person) are experiencing (LAD) and will still
resurrect in a real temporal (yet to be) future? My aim, throughout, will be to answer these
questions in the affirmative by arguing for a concept called “Simultaneous Resurrection.”16 That
said, there are myriad complications with respect to how we approach these questions, especially

15

This point is not necessarily to be taken hyper-literally or to be in anyway disaffirming the Liberty University
Doctrinal Statement that reads: “We affirm that the return of Christ for all believers is imminent. It will be followed
by seven years of great tribulation, and then the coming of Christ to establish His earthly kingdom for a thousand
years. The unsaved will then be raised and judged according to their works and separated forever from God in hell.
The saved, having been raised, will live forever in heaven in fellowship with God.” The results of this project then
should fit well within the agreed upon doctrinal statement as so stated.
16

Not to be confused with the Thomistic account of resurrection where all people, both believer and nonbeliever, resurrect at the same time (simultaneously). Discussed in Saint Thomas Aquinas, The Summa Theologica.
Vol. 2, in Great books of the Western World, no. 20. Edited by Robert Maynard Hutchins, translated by Fathers of
the English Dominican Province (Chicago, IL: Encyclopedia Britannica, Inc., 1952), 943-947. The working definition
of “simultaneous resurrection” as it pertains to this project will be discussed below.
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with respect to the tenses used in their wording. I take it that the answer to the above questions
is “yes”; however, in a less than obvious way.17
What does it mean to say that someone has both already resurrected and will resurrect?
Might it be a more probable than not that the eschaton is an eternally present reality to God (e.g.
Abraham is living resurrection life to God) and that it will still, in the temporal future, happen to
all human beings (including Abraham)?18 Minimally, these questions seem to have direct
consequences on the nature of time, and in particular, God’s time, which is often noted as
“eternity” or some variation thereof.19
God’s particular brand of time, if one is to call God’s existence “time-like” in any way, is
indeed a point of contention within the discipline of theology.20 There are myriad views, some
insisting that God exists in endless temporal duration and others insisting on God’s existence as
an atemporal existence; some citing duration and others not (not to mention the other theories
with respect to sempiternity and the like). Positing God as timeless/atemporal seems to me to be
the theory of God’s existence that has the ever-present “ring of truth”; however, working out a

17

The proffered theory of Simultaneous Resurrection is not to be confused, or associated, with Hans Küng’s
theory whereby upon death we enter immediately into resurrection. While that wording is very similar to
Simultaneous Resurrection, Küng’s thought includes not a physical resurrection but a dying into God.
Simultaneous Resurrection affirms that upon death a person enters resurrection life, but in no way does it affirm a
possibility of “dying into God” and whatever that might mean. Küng’s idea is explicated in his Eternal life,
translated by Edward Quinn (Garden City, NY: Double Day, 1984), 136-142.
18

By “eschaton” I mean the Christian doctrine of Christ’s second coming and the resurrection of the dead at the
end of time.
19

In the proceeding paper, ‘eternity’, ‘eternal’, and ‘atemporal’ will most often reference the same thing. In
most of the literature concerning the philosophical nature of God’s atemporal or temporal existence ‘atemporal’
and ‘eternal’ are used synonymously; however, while for the majority of this paper it will be true that these words
can be used interchangeably, there will be a specific instance where a distinction must be made (Chapter four
below).
20

Alan G. Padgett, “God and Time: Toward a New Doctrine of Divine Timeless Eternity,” Religious Studies 25
(June, 1989): 209. He says the following: “…God is in time. But I do not think it is proper to say that God is in our
time. God transcends time, and he is the Creator of space-time. It is theologically more proper to say that we are
in God’s time…”
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timeless conception largely ends up being not unlike trying to fit a square peg into a round hole.
Of course, the two main views with respect to the manner of God’s existence are:
(1) God exists in time and
(2) God exists outside of time.
If (1) is true, then, with respect to answering eschatological questions, it seems to yield a pretty
straightforward conclusion. If God exists completely in time, (and if the orthodox version of the
doctrine of resurrection is true) then people really will only resurrect at the end of this earth’s
duration and Jesus’ words to the Sadducees in Matthew 22 would simply be offering some other
type of evidence for scriptural proof of the resurrection not otherwise clearly seen. However, if
(2) is true, then, not only are there a whole host of difficulties for which a plausible solution must
be found in order to show that the idea of a timeless God is coherent, but there is also the
difficulty of explaining how such a truth impacts the resurrection of temporal individuals. I take
it to be a strength of holding (1) to be true that (1)’s being true helps avoid some of these
complicated issues. Even so, (1)’s being true, and so God’s being temporal, leads, as I take it, to
an unsatisfactory and unsatisfying premise with which to begin to understand just what Christ is
asserting about the afterlife in passages such as Matthew 22, Luke 23, and others.21 It is (2),
then, that I wish to affirm and will defend.
If it happens that a salient defense of God’s atemporal existence can be given, further
questions remain to be asked with respect to human resurrection. After all, it is one thing to say
that God exists outside of time; it seems to be quite another to say that His existing outside of
time has implications for the events occurring in the lives (and next lives) of human temporal

21

Similarly, while a defense of the B-series of time will be given in this paper, it is not the case that A-series will
be undermined. The point of the paper is not to disprove or say that A-series is incoherent, but rather to imply
that B-series is the best theory of time to account for the argument given by Jesus in Matthew 22 and the promise
given in Luke 23.
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individuals. What would it mean for Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob (for example), from their point
of view, to die and immediately experience (LAD)? Is it plausible that, for them and other dead
individuals, the eschaton is an already-experienced event even though, temporally and biblically
speaking, it is an event that is going to take place thousands of years after their death? Is it
coherent and philosophically responsible to posit that a temporal being has both resurrected into
atemporal reality and will still come to resurrect in temporal reality without ever repeating the
action? In other words, is it logically and metaphysically coherent to say that a person can
resurrect once and for all but yet the action occur in two frames of reference? It seems to me that
the answers to these questions for all practical purposes is “yes”; however, there will be much
more philosophical nuancing to distinguish specifically to what this “yes” refers.

Tethered to Scripture
If the Christian’s exegesis of Scripture should also be informed by philosophical inquiry,
as it seems that most of the time it must, then it is important to ask the philosophical questions
surrounding the statements of Jesus in Matthew 22:31-32. It is one thing to say that we can
discover, through biblical studies and hermeneutics, that Christ is talking about the resurrection
of the dead, it is an entirely different matter to ask how it is the case that Abraham, Isaac, and
Jacob might possibly both be experiencing resurrection life ((LAD) in the eternal present) and be
resurrected (in the temporal future). Further, if those who have died are already living
resurrection life in the resurrected Cosmos, then this bears significant implications on theological
studies concerning things like body/soul dualism, the doctrine of election/predestination, and so
forth. Joseph Bracken states:
The relation between time and eternity is the crucial problem in eschatology and
its solution has implications for all parts of Christian doctrine. The identity of
those who will be raised with those who are now alive; the relation of the future

9

of God’s kingdom at the end of history to its being present in the work of Jesus;
the relation of the general resurrection of the dead at the return of Jesus to the fact
that even at death those who sleep in him are already with him, so that their
fellowship with him is not broken; the relation of Jesus himself to his earthly
work; and last but not least, the relation of the eternal kingship of God and his
world government to the futurity of his kingdom – all these are questions and
themes that are without answers, and the substance of them cannot be understood,
so long as we do not clarify the relation between time and eternity.22
I will not discuss all of these topics, but it seems to me that the ramifications of a paper
such as this one could be farther reaching than just the manner of the resurrection. After all,
from a hermeneutical as well as philosophical point of view, it seems that Jesus must be saying
something significant to the Sadducees in Matthew 22. If he is saying that God is the God of the
living by simply indicating a future resurrection of the dead, then Jesus is being fallacious and is
merely begging the question. In other words, is Jesus saying here, “The resurrection of the dead
will happen because the resurrection of the dead will happen,” or is he saying, “The resurrection
will happen because your fathers, Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob are currently experiencing
resurrection life”? The first question is viciously circular, so we ought not think Jesus is saying
that; however, the second question seems to be an argument from proof. I take it Jesus’
argument might be along the lines of arguing something like: “The Washington Capitals have a
Hart Trophy winner during the existence of the franchise. To prove it, I can point to Alexander
Ovechkin, a member of the Washington Capitals, who wins the award in the years 2008 and
2009.”
Perhaps there is a third option. Jesus might be saying, “The resurrection of the dead is a
true fact because Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob, who are currently in a spiritual state, are waiting to
be resurrected.” But an argument like that seems weak, at best. Indeed some Jewish scholars,
argue against Jesus’ use of Exodus 3:6 in the above passage; they say that Jesus’ argument for
22

Joseph A. Bracken, SJ, “A New Look at Time and Eternity,” Theology and Science 2 (April, 2004): 77.
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the resurrection, in this passage, is false because they take it that He speaks of Abraham, Isaac,
and Jacob as being resurrected.23 However, if Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob really are experiencing
(LAD) with God and are also to be resurrected in the future, then Jesus is supplying both
evidence for the biblical doctrine of resurrection and providing future hope in the coming of the
resurrected Cosmos. In light of the skepticism regarding Jesus’ words, my attempt herein will be
to help Christians gain insight into the hermeneutical difficulties presented by Jesus’ somewhat
cryptic words by both backing Jesus’ argument and giving Christian theology a further means by
which to insist on physical resurrection.
Further, the argument just may give existential grounding to the necessity of physical
resurrection and why life in the particular bodies that we have on this earth matters. To wit,
what will be attempted in the forthcoming pages is an explication and explanation, in a
philosophically rigorous manner, of just how it is possible for a person to be both resurrected
into the eternal “now” and at some future time resurrect in the temporal “then.” The attempt will
be made in the following way: first, I will demonstrate that it is God’s mode of existence that
ensures this possibility (which will entail an affirmative defense of God’s existence as
timelessly-eternal/simultaneous-whole). I will then move to show that because God’s mode of
existence is atemporal, and He exists in a simultaneous-whole existence, that upon death and the
ratification of the relationship between the human and the Creator, it follows that death and
resurrection have eternal-temporal simultaneity.24 Before I can proceed, however, I must clarify
some terminology.

23

Dan Cohn-Sherbok, “Jesus' Defense of the Resurrection of the Dead,” Journal for the Study of the New
Testament (April 1981): 65-66.
24

Eleonore Stump and Norman Kretzmann, “Eternity,” The Journal of Philosophy 78 (August 1981): 429-458.

11

Clarifications
Since the novel topic of this project is termed “Simultaneous Resurrection,” perhaps it is
appropriate to begin unpacking what this means.25 While SR, with respect to physical
resurrection, is a brand new concept (at least there do not seem to be any publications on it
specifically) it is not completely out of whole cloth. The idea of Simultaneous Resurrection rests
not on the idea of temporal simultaneity whereby events occurring simultaneously are happening
at one and the same time; rather, SR attempts to express, in a cogent manner, a coherent ontology
with respect to a person’s death happening in real time, and that same person simultaneously
experiencing (LAD) at the moment of death, in some mode of existence that is not quite in time
and not quite out of it. To be clear, what is not being argued for is something like the following:
(RF): On February 12, 2012 Jones dies in a car accident and, in the next
temporal moment, experiences waking up in his post-resurrection body.
but rather something like,
(RS): On February 12, 2012 Jones dies in a car accident and simultaneously
experiences full-resurrection life (LAD).26
Additionally, it needs to be clear that this concept is not arguing that Jones’s life on earth
is going on temporally simultaneous with his resurrected life in the Kingdom of God because, as
will be spelled out in the forthcoming chapters, Jones’s resurrection life is something other than
temporal. Accordingly, SR does not wish to suggest the omnipresence or dual presence of a
finite human being or any violation of the law of non-contradiction/law of identity. If the
concept of Simultaneous Resurrection were to say something to that effect, then a whole new
25

The Simultaneous Resurrection theory will be referred to primarily as “SR” from henceforward.

26

By “full-resurrection life” this project means to say: active life in the resurrected cosmos with the fullness of
persons concurrently existing as if all of resurrected humanity had been there for all time.
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discussion about self-identity over time, duality or non-duality of a person over time, etc. would
open up. As it currently stands, and as will be seen in the subsequent chapters, such discussion is
not necessary because Simultaneous Resurrection absolutely affirms that a person, such as Jones,
exists only in time when he indeed exists in time. So:
(RF*): Jones’s death and resurrection are temporally simultaneous
is false while
(RS*): Jones’s death and resurrection are simultaneous eternal-temporally27
is true.
But then (RS*) introduces an interesting concept. Eternal-temporal simultaneity. In brief,
this concept expresses the idea that, because God exists outside of time, having in his possession
both all of eternity and all of time in their ontological reality (i.e. simultaneously-whole), it
follows that Jones’s death and resurrection (e.g. as two temporal events) are equally real to God,
occurring simultaneously in the eternal-temporal sense. This concept will be much more
thoroughly addressed in chapter two in order to show exactly why God’s simultaneously-whole
existence affects Jones’s resurrection experience.
We must also clarify Simultaneous Resurrection, by way of definition, as a sort of
outgrowth of an expression of the popular medieval concept of ‘eternity’ that will be heavily
relied upon in this paper. This definition is, after all, the theory that this entire argument rests
upon. If the forgoing definition of eternity is proven false, the entire argument is in shambles.
Philosopher-theologian, Boethius, most famously gives his expression of perhaps the most
popular medieval view of God’s eternity when he says:
God is eternal; in this judgment all rational beings agree. Let us, then, consider
what eternity is. For this word carries with it a revelation alike of the Divine
27

Stump and Kretzmann, “Eternity,”: 436.
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nature and the Divine knowledge. Now, eternity is the possession of endless life
whole and perfect at a single moment. What this is becomes more clear and
manifest from a comparison with things temporal. For whatever lives in time is a
present proceeding from the past to the future, there is nothing set in time which
can embrace the whole space of its life together. To-morrow’s state it grasps not
yet, while it has already lost yesterday’s; nay, even in the life of to-day ye live no
longer than one brief transitory moment. Whatever, therefore, is subject to the
condition of time…it yet is not such as rightly to be thought eternal. For it does
not include and embrace the whole space of infinite life at once…Accordingly,
that which includes and possesses the whole fullness of unending life at once,
from which nothing future is absent, from which nothing past has escaped, this is
rightly called eternal…28
Boethius’ definition is then explained more simply by Thomas Aquinas as: “The simultaneouswhole and perfect possession of interminable life.”29 While this is a more condensed version of
Boethius’ statement, it is not the case that Aquinas left it at that. In fact, he spends the course of
the next several pages (broken up in articles, answers and objections) plotting out exactly what
he believes Boethius (and perhaps others like Plotinus and Augustine who used similar versions
preceding Boethius) may have meant.30 It is for this reason that the Thomistic theory of eternity
will be used as the main definition of eternity to help argue for the concept of Simultaneous
Resurrection.31
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However, with this definition come other confusions with regard to the nature of
possessing interminable life as a simultaneous-whole. Wolfhart Pannenburg, though not an
atemporalist in the way Aquinas is, says rightly that: “God, who has the future in himself, is
eternally present to the whole of creaturely life, to present and future.”32 Existence as a
simultaneously-whole being is going to at least mean that much and also mean that God is in
perfect possession of the entirety of His life (which will be argued is eternal and therefore not
temporal) as well. Accordingly, because this is suggesting that all times are apparently grasped
and present to God, a B-series account of time will have to be given. While a more complete
outworking of B-series time will be discussed in forthcoming pages, suffice it to say the main
difference between A-series and B-series time is that B-series time insists that all points in time
hold ontological equivalency; that is, all points in time are equally real to God (i.e. do not cease
to exist). That said, A-series time is not rejected because of incoherence but, as is stated earlier,
because it is unsatisfactory and lacks explanatory power for the difficult statements in Scripture
that this project seeks to discuss.33 I will now formally state the argument that I will address in
the subsequent chapters.

The Argument for Simultaneous Resurrection
We proceed then to the formal statement of the argument for Simultaneous Resurrection.
The argument goes as follows:
(PR1): God exists in an atemporal, eternal, simultaneously-whole existence.
(PR2): Anything that exists in a simultaneously-whole existence simultaneously
experiences every temporal and eternal event and entity.
32
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(PR3): Jones’s death and resurrection are temporal events to God and all who
know Jones.34
(PR4): Jones participates in the temporal resurrection of believers by virtue of his
being a believer and by virtue of his resurrection.
(PR5): Any entity that God is present to and has consciousness experiences the
“nowness” of God. 35
(PR6): It is possible that, though dead on this earth, a person continues on in
conscious fullness of being.
(PR7): At temporal death, if Jones is a disciple of Christ, then his sanctification
and glorification are complete.
(PR8): If Jones’s sanctification and glorification are complete, then his natural
being is not subject to change.
(PR9): Any being (other than God) whose natural being is not subject to change is
æviternal.
(PR10): Because æviternal existence shares in God’s eternity, a human’s
æviternal existence includes experience of the temporal physical
resurrection event and so (LAD); therefore,
(CR1): Jones experiences the “nowness” of God when participating in the
resurrection of believers (from (PR1)-(PR5)).
(CR2): Jones experiences the “nowness” of God when he dies (from (PR1)(PR6)).
(CR3): God simultaneously experiences both Jones’s temporal death and temporal
resurrection (from (PR1)-(PR4)).
(CR4): If Jones is a believer and Jones is temporally dead, Jones is æviternal
(from (PR7)-(PR9)).
(CR5): If Jones is æviternal, Jones experiences (LAD) (from (PR1)-(PR10).
34
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(SR): At temporal death, Jones then experiences æviternal (LAD) (from (CR1)(CR5)).
Seemingly, this argument is sound for Simultaneous Resurrection. The main conclusion
that is supposed to point the way toward a new theory of resurrection is (SR) which logically
follows from (PR1) all the way through (CR5). That said, a whole host of truth claims abound in
premises (PR1) – (PR10) and conclusions (CR1) – (SR) and so the nature of the forthcoming
discussion will be an attempt to defend each of these premises (save for obvious ones like (PR3)
– (PR5).36
A large portion of this paper is admittedly pure philosophical speculation; there are
concepts here of which it simply must be conceded we do not have a complete grasp. In fact, it
might as well be said that we may never have a complete grasp of them. Inability to fully
comprehend the nature of an infinite being and His impact on a finite world should be fully
satisfactory for the finite human. As Henri Blocher states: “[we] should not grieve over the good
limitation our wise and gracious eternal God decided to grant to us.”37 If this is truly as much of
a “bold move,” as Blocher thinks such an argument would be, I hope that I will do it justice.38
I have chosen the Thomistic view of eternity because it seems to give the most robust
account of the concept (i.e. it gives a thorough fleshing out of the medieval concept of eternity),
and it also seems to allow for an intriguing and hopeful solution to the question: “where do we go
when we die?” Further, it seems to me, that – though it may be less than obvious to the reader at
this stage – the Thomistic view, because of said reasons, leads to a more robust view of God’s
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eternal existence as well as a more robust view of (LAD) because of the way God’s manner of
existence affects temporal creatures. I have serious doubts, however, that simply asserting the
Thomistic view of God’s eternity will satisfy many. Let us, then, turn to the task of discussing
whether or not the Thomistic account really is worth noting.
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CHAPTER TWO
Aquinas’s Theory of Time With Respect to God’s Eternity

Having explained the reason for selecting Thomas Aquinas’s particular explication of
God’s eternal existence, and so the nature of time, it is time now to explain some of the
particulars that make St. Thomas’s theory not only more robust than those of some of the other
medievals’ but also more helpful in giving a solid speculative foundation for the conclusion of
this project. In particular, the way in which St. Thomas expresses God’s atemporal/eternal
existence and his expansion on the Boethian idea of eternity as “The simultaneous-whole and
perfect possession of interminable life”39 figures prominently in having a full understanding of
his view. Moreover, a proper understanding of eternity will help defend (PR1) which states:
(PR1): God exists in an atemporal, eternal, simultaneously-whole existence.
In question ten of the first part of the Summa Theologica, Aquinas raises a question with
respect to “The Eternity of God.”40 In his introduction to the question, he offers up the classic
expression of God’s eternal existence from Boethius in the form of an objection: “We proceed
thus to the first article: It seems that the definition of eternity given by Boethius (De Consol.v) is
not a good one: ‘Eternity is the simultaneously-whole and perfect possession of interminable
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life.’”41 Not only that, but he proceeds over the next several articles to explain why he thinks
that the Boethian definition is an accurate portrayal of God’s mode of existence. As is the case
with most medieval theologians,42 Aquinas hangs his theory of God’s eternal existence on the
doctrine of God’s divine immutability. He does not state this outright in his definition, and
defense of the definition, of eternity qua eternity; rather, he states that what is eternal must be
immutable because eternity is not the same as the measure of time. In other words, where time
measures the movement from before to after, and so on, eternity does nothing of the sort.43
Expanding on that notion, Thomas asserts that eternity can be known and defended by
identifying the two identity conditions of eternity. They are: interminability (i.e. lack of
beginning and ending) and lack of succession.44 Admittedly those two identity conditions seem
to reduce to the same condition, but perhaps that is what Thomas intends here. Either way, the
bottom line is that the idea of eternity qua eternity rests in the idea of immutability, the inability
to change.45
It appears fairly obvious that whatever does not have or cannot have succession or change
cannot thus be measured by time. According to Thomas, who relies heavily on Aristotle, time is
the measure of before and after, so if a thing does not and cannot change and has no beginning or
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ending, then it is atemporal in the eternal sense.46 This is altogether different from arguing that
God is an eternal being; instead, it is simply that Aquinas is arguing for the definition of eternity
as made famous by Boethius. In order to move from a proper definition of eternity to God’s
eternal existence, Aquinas needs to make another argument concerning the definition of eternity.
He furthers his argument for God’s eternal existence in his second objection to question ten
article one. The objection reads thusly:
Further, eternity signifies a certain kind of duration. But duration regards being
rather than life. Therefore the word life ought not to come into the definition of
eternity.47
The nature of duration and life in atemporality in the eternal sense then becomes his next
argument and clarification. Interestingly enough, Aquinas anticipates much of the same
arguments that plague his theory today.48 There are huge implications in human language when
terms like ‘life’ and ‘duration’ are invoked. ‘Duration,’ in particular, is a term that ought to be
used very carefully when discussing any notion of atemporal existence. That said, the topic of
duration will be covered more fully in chapter three; as for now, a better understanding of how
Aquinas counters the objections he raises in the above text needs to be addressed.
What does Thomas mean when he affirms that that which is eternal has duration? I take
it that he means that that which is eternal has duration in act49: “the protraction of duration seems
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to belong to operation….”50 By “operation,” if he is to be consistent, he must therefore be
referring to continual act and the lack of potentiality in the eternal being. In other words,
‘duration’ for Thomas holds an understanding and meaning that may fall outside the traditional
usage of the term. Not only that, but Thomas has already said in his First Way that God is pure
act having nothing potential as the Unmoved Mover.51 It seems to me that Aquinas is both
affirming duration and non-succession in eternity, but how is this possible?
Eleonore Stump and Norman Kretzmann spend some time analyzing this question. They
indicate that they “…understand this part of [Boethius’ definition] to mean that the life of an
eternal entity is characterized by beginningless, endless, duration;” a “duration of a special
sort.”52 That “special sort” seems to be the combination of duration in act and lack of
potentiality. Fittingly, Stump and Kretzmann conclude that on Aquinas’s view “the life that is
the mode of an eternal entity’s existence is thus characterized not only by duration but also by
atemporality.”53
So, what does all this mean? It seems to mean something that our language is limited in
its ability to connotatively express. Perhaps in the case of eternal existence, if an eternal entity is
said to have life and not just being, and God is that sort of eternal being, then He has a kind of
duration that is unlike ours.
On this particular point, Garrett DeWeese makes a poignant insight: “At least intuitively
it would seem that life must involve some duration, that a life lived instantaneously is not
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anything like what we would mean by ‘life.’”54 While combining atemporal “duration” and
DeWeeses’s insight might not give an intellectually pleasing or easily decipherable concept, it
seems that such paradoxical concepts find fast friends in discussions on the nature of God (e.g.
discussions on the hypostatic union, the Trinity, etc.).
Simply stated, an eternal entity’s existence is pure act; therefore, if this being is to be the
first mover, and so possesses life that is pure act and lacks potentiality, this being’s duration must
therefore not be duration of succession but simply duration of act.55 Reading Aquinas in this
way concerning duration of unchanging action (i.e. act) seems compelling, given his statements
with respect to immutability. Thomas holds to a very strict sense of divine immutability
whereby:
God is infinite, comprehending in Himself all plentitude of perfection of all being,
he cannot acquire anything new, nor extend Himself to anything to which He was
not extended previously. Hence movement in no way belongs to Him.56
Since there is no movement in God, in the sense of changing from point a to point b, a
number of truths follow; however, for my present purposes, the most germane truth that follows
is atemporal existence. That is, God’s not containing any succession or movement renders Him
outside of time. Invariably, people may bring up the common understanding of God’s movement
in history. What Thomas will simply say is that the usages of the word “movement” and
“moves,” with regards to God, must simply be metaphor or other figurative language.57
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To Paul Helm, the more classical understanding of divine immutability is the
quintessential way of expressing a robust doctrine of the nature of God:
To many, the idea that God is subject to the vicissitudes of temporal passage, with
more and more of his life irretrievably over and done with, is incompatible with
divine sovereignty, with divine perfection and with that fullness of being that is
essential to God. The temporalist view may be intelligible, but it does not do
justice to the nature of God’s being.58
Because divine immutability is the ground of the possibility of atemporal existence, chapter four
will discuss this idea further. For now, however, it simply needs to be said that the Thomistic
view of eternity is posited to be endless duration of a special sort (as described above) and an
essential property of any entity that does not change (since by definition, time is the measure of
before and after (i.e. change)), namely, God. There remains, however, one aspect of the
Boethian definition of eternity that must be explored and drawn out in the Thomistic account, as
well as his usage of the said definition. It is this aspect that is, perhaps, the crucial piece of the
eternity puzzle: the notion of the “simultaneously-whole.”

Simultaneously-Whole and the B-series of Time
What does it mean for a being to have a simultaneously-whole existence that has
complete possession of interminable life? For an answer to this question, we need to look back
to the definition stated previously concerning the word simultaneous. In particular, it is helpful
to remember that most people take for granted that, as Eleonore Stump points out, ‘simultaneous’
typically means “existence or occurrence at one and the same time.”59 However, ‘simultaneity’
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in this project will be defined more simply than that; herein, it is defined only as “existence or
occurrence at once (i.e. together).”60
Of course anything that is an eternal “event” will be occurring at once with all events in
the eternal present. If the eternal present is as the atemporalists wish to define “eternity” in that
there is no sequence in time, then there is just what there is. Unfortunately though, many
philosophers balk at the idea that events in time can occur simultaneously (i.e. at once) with any
type of present other than the temporal type of present. In other words, on the view that
‘simultaneity’ means “occurrence at one and the same time,” if a temporal event occurs at t1 and
another temporal event at t2, then those two temporal events are not simultaneous unless they
both occur at t1. Or, if t1 and t2 are both simultaneous and t1 happens to be simultaneous with t3,
then so is t2 simultaneous with t3 since temporal simultaneity is transitive. If simultaneity is
transitive in this way and eternity insists on this type of simultaneity, then Anthony Kenny’s
objection still reigns:
Indeed, the whole concept of a timeless eternity, the whole of which is
simultaneous with every part of time, seems to be radically incoherent. For
simultaneity as ordinarily understood is a transitive relationship. If A happens at
the same time as B, and B happens at the same time as C, then A happens at the
same time as C. If the BBC programme and the ITV programme both start when
Big Ben strikes ten, then they both start at the same time. But, on St. Thomas’
view, my typing of this paper is simultaneous with the whole of eternity. Again,
on his view, the great fire of Rome is simultaneous with the whole of eternity.
Therefore, while I type these very words, Nero fiddles heartlessly on.
Fortunately, there have been wonderful strides in the discussion on simultaneity. While
additional objections will be raised concerning eternal existence as a simultaneous-whole, we
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must move on to a current understanding of ‘simultaneity’ by those who hold to an eternalist
perspective.61
Perhaps the most significant achievement, with respect to understanding an eternalist
perspective of simultaneity, has been made by Eleonore Stump and Norman Kretzmann in their
1981 article, “Eternity.” In this article they clarify the medieval notion of eternity, and in
particular Thomas Aquinas’s; however, their most important contribution (especially given the
thesis of this paper) seems to be their efforts to loose the effects of transitivity from the definition
of simultaneity in the eternal perspective (i.e. existence or occurrence at once). How they do this
is quite ingenious. Their complicated model is predicated on the Special Theory of Relativity
(STR), as posited by Albert Einstein, in an attempt to both call God the grounding of all reality
(and so not relative) and also to call into question the idea that simultaneity has to be transitive
due to a single vantage point (the vantage point of temporal existence). The crux of their
argument has its foundation in the distinction between temporal simultaneity (T-simultaneity),
eternal/atemporal simultaneity (E-simultaneity), and what they call eternal-temporal simultaneity
(ET-simultaneity).62 They make their distinctions in the following way:
T-simultaneity = existence or occurrence at one and the same time.
E-simultaneity = existence or occurrence at one and the same eternal present.63
These definitions are all well and good, but the main issue here is how two things can be
simultaneous to each other while one is in a temporal frame of reference (i.e. temporal point of
view) and the other is in an eternal frame of reference (i.e. eternal point of view). In order to
61
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combat conventional wisdom which says that one ought to come up with another “existence or
occurrence at one and the same ____” statement, Stump and Kretzmann argue that, according to
the concept of having two different frames of reference from which to view an event, it is
theoretically impossible to define a single mode of existence for the two relata of which one is
eternal and one is temporal.64 So, then, it is:
…not conceptually possible to construct a definition for ET-simultaneity
analogous to the definition for the other two species of simultaneity, by spelling
out ‘at once’ as ‘at one and the same ___’ and filling in the blank appropriately.
What is temporal and eternal can co-exist, on the view we are adopting and
defending, but not within the same mode of existence; and there is no single mode
of existence that can be referred to in filling in the blank in such a definition of
ET-simultaneity.
Though at first glance this statement comes across as unsatisfactory and explanatorily
vacuous, they are quick to point out that the concept of T-simultaneity is just as vacuous. They
do this by explaining a thought experiment where there exist two observers. One observer is on
a train going extremely fast (just barely slower than the speed of light) and the other is standing
stationary relative to the train on the dock. As the train is screaming down the track, two
lightning bolts hit it, one on the front of the train and one on the back. From the observer on the
dock’s point of view, the lightning bolts hit the train simultaneously, at one and the same time.
However, according to the observer on the train, the lightning bolts hit at different times. The
lightning bolt that hit the back of the train hit before the one on the front of the train because the
train was moving very quickly toward the bolt that hit the front. So, essentially, the argument is
that the bolts both did hit the train at one and the same time and they did not hit the train at one
and the same time. Were there only one temporal reference frame this thought experiment would
lead to a contradiction; however, this shows, instead of demonstrating a contradiction, that each
respective observer’s reference frame determines the truth of their statement. So, it is not correct
64

Ibid., 436.

27

to say then, on STR and this given example, that the lightning bolts hit at one and the same time;
but, rather, that the bolts occurred at the same time within the reference frame of only one of the
given observers (the observer on the dock).65
In an effort to define what an ontological reality might mean to this manner simultaneity,
Stump and Kretzmann offer the following definition and characterization of ET-simultaneity:
(ET) For every x and for every y, x and y are ET-simultaneous iff
(i)

either x is eternal and y is temporal, or vice versa; and

(ii)

for some observer, A, in the unique eternal reference frame,
x and y are both present-i.e., either x is eternally present and
y is observed as temporally present, or vice versa; and

(iii)

for some observer, B, in one and the infinitely many
temporal reference frames, x and y are both present – i.e.,
either x is observed as eternally present and y is temporally
present, or vice versa.66

Of course these guidelines are meant only to impact the way in which all temporal events can be
said to be simultaneous to an eternal entity – God -- and not be simultaneous with each other. In
other words, so stated, ET-simultaneity avoids the transitivity objection. More will be argued on
this in chapter three, especially with respect to the questions surrounding what it means for an
eternal entity to observe an event as temporally present (Stump and Kretzman’s (ii)) but the
Stump/Kretzmann position has been stated simply to show that there are modern seemingly
coherent theories which argue for the atemporal nature of God’s existence. More will be said on
the ET-simultaneity theory in the next chapter because of its importance in backing premises
(PR2),
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(PR2): Anything that exists in a simultaneously-whole existence simultaneously
experiences every temporal and eternal event and entity,
and (PR10),
(PR10): Because æviternal existence shares in God’s eternity, a human’s
æviternal existence includes experience of the temporal physical
resurrection event and so (LAD)
in the argument for SR, but the preceding explanation cleared the way for a good opportunity to
now explain why God’s having a simultaneously-whole existence necessitates a B-series view of
time.
The B-series theory of time is a much-derided theory in contemporary philosophy of
religion, and though it is the view held by a vast minority in the current literature, it seems to
have been the predominant view of the medievals, particularly with respect to the idea of eternity
consisting of a simultaneously-whole existence. Additionally, B-series time is the undergirding
ontology behind the following premises in the argument for SR:
(PR1): God exists in an atemporal, eternal, simultaneously-whole existence,
(PR2): Anything that exists in a simultaneously-whole existence simultaneously
experiences every temporal and eternal event and entity,
(PR10): Because æviternal existence shares in God’s eternity, a human’s
æviternal existence includes experience of the temporal physical
resurrection event and so (LAD),
(CR3): God simultaneously experiences both Jones’s temporal death and temporal
resurrection,
(CR5): If Jones is æviternal, Jones experiences (LAD), and
(SR): At temporal death, Jones then experiences æviternal (LAD).
Not surprisingly then, as with the majority of the medieval theologians, Aquinas too
seems to be a B-theorist since he holds that all future contingent beings are fully present to God
in his eternally present existence. This eternal presence gives God the ability to experience these
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contingent beings as they are in the temporal now and as they will be in the temporal “then,” all
in one non-sequential, non-temporal, durative experience. In other words, He sees them as they
are fully in their being and existence.67
Though the medievals may not have formally categorized themselves as B-theorists, it
seems that the B-series view is really the only theory that can give a robust and satisfactory
account for how it is the case that God is present to all things temporal, even the things that,
temporally speaking, are not yet. In short, the B-series of time argues that all points on the
temporal line are ontologically equivalent and that there is no ontological priority to the temporal
now, rather than earlier today or later down the temporal road.
So, in stark contrast to the more normative A-series of time, B-series does not take tensed
expressions of language as seriously as the A-series proponents do. That is to say, B-series
proponents use terms like “earlier than” and “later than,” among others, whereas A-series
proponents use words like “past” and “future.” Though this difference may come across as
insignificant to those new to the language-game of time, the significance in this distinction
cannot be missed. On this point, the B-theorist would say that the events of 1970 are just as real
as both the events going on this instant and the events going on in 2012.
Using an example more relevant to the SR thesis, a person’s temporal death and temporal
resurrection are equally and occurrently real and ontologically equivalent. We must be clear,
however, that this does not imply that these events are continually temporally occurring; rather,
all events are atemporally and eternally existent to God. If God is the grounding of all reality,
then God co-exists with all times earlier and later than the current time, albeit in a different mode
of existence than we inhabit. This means then, that in some real way, events normally
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considered by finite beings to be dead and gone are not ontologically dead and gone, for they are
still existent to God. This does not mean that God is currently watching, in a temporally present
sense, some event E; rather, he sees E atemporally knowing full-well just when it did occur in
time.
William Lane Craig offers a critique that ought to be addressed immediately with respect
to God’s seeing some event E atemporally. Craig seems to think that a B-series view of time has
catastrophic implications, specifically, for major theological truths:
[What B-Series] implies for events like the crucifixion and resurrection of Christ
is very troubling. In a sense Christ hangs permanently on the cross, for the
dreadful events of AD. 30 never fade away or transpire. The victory of the
resurrection becomes a hollow triumph, for the spatiotemporal parts of Jesus that
were crucified are buried and remain dying and dead and are never raised to new
life.68
But why must this be so? Take particular note of Craig’s usage of certain temporally tensed
words. For example, Craig says that on a B-series view of time “Christ hangs permanently on
the cross.” Surely, however, Craig does not believe that those who hold to a B-series view
believe such nonsense. Instead, it might be better said that on a B-series view, the sacrifice of
Christ on the cross is always a present truth to God, one that He atemporally experiences. Is the
victory of the resurrection rendered hollow? I do not see why this should be.
The victory of the resurrection is fully accomplished in the temporal effects of God’s
triumph through His will for the sake of humanity (who exists in the temporal) and for His glory;
glory that is never diminished nor could be diminished. The victory only means victory
(whereby “victory” means something like: “a forthcoming success against temporally current
opposition”) to the temporal individual. The victory given to humanity and declared by the
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resurrection of Jesus is not a victory for God qua God as if He were in some kind of contest. In
other words, even before Christ came to earth, God always eternally has victory.69 What must be
distinguished is that in the temporal existence of the created order God declared victory to
humanity through the resurrection of the Son. Because the created order is viewed by temporal
individuals from a temporal reference frame (though more than one), the victory is not hollow.
To those existing in the temporal mode of existence, that which was to be accomplished was
accomplished in time at the resurrection of Christ. In this sense, because to those in temporal
existence the resurrection of Christ is a past event, it is an everlasting70 victory for humanity.
It is a wholly-other matter for God since God’s victory in the resurrection of Christ does
not hang in the balance of time, but rather finds its fulfillment in the eternal will of God that
cannot be thwarted. Further, Christ’s spatiotemporal parts indeed do resurrect and do not remain
buried. To ‘remain’ is to be temporal, and as was discussed, temporally, Christ most certainly
did resurrect. Atemporally, the ontological truth of Christ’s life, death, burial, and resurrection is
being experienced by God, but temporally they have passed. The atemporal experience of God
in this instance does not seem to be analogous to the temporal experience of man. For, by
definition, atemporal is the negation of time, a mode of existence for which humans have no
experience. With respect to the believer’s death and resurrection, God experiences both
simultaneously and in the same fashion in which He experiences Christ’s death and resurrection.
If this is true, then we should have support for:
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(PR2): Anything that exists in a simultaneously-whole existence simultaneously
experiences every temporal and eternal event and entity
and
(CR3): God simultaneously experiences both Jones’s temporal death and temporal
resurrection,
two premises crucial for the conclusion that, at temporal death, a believer experiences SR
((LAD)).71

Modes of Existence
Perhaps one of the most interesting parts of Aquinas’s doctrines regarding God and His
relationship with time is the way in which Thomas sees the impact of an eternal God on all of
temporal creation. Given that there are different modes of being: corporeal, incorporeal (angels),
and immutably incorporeal (God); there are, to Thomas, distinct ways in which these beings
interact with time. I have already dealt with God and the corporeal (i.e. humans and other
physical beings); however, I have not yet dealt with the incorporeal non-eternal/finite beings,
like the angels. Admittedly, the concept that Aquinas is going to explicate here is rather
difficult, but it is not impossible.
The three modes of existence that appear in Thomas’s work are eternity, time, and
æviternity. Eternity applies to God alone since there is no change in Him in any regard; time is
given to those who do change and are measured by change, and æviternity is given to those who
do not change but can have change annexed to them.72 Some philosophers disagree that Aquinas
is explaining three modes of existence; however, while the objection is noted, I wish to point out
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a few reasons why this objection is a mistaken one.73 To begin, Aquinas makes remarks
differentiating the three. For example: he says, “others assign the difference between these
three,” and then goes on to give three sets of rules for differentiating between the three modes of
existence and for determining who and what are measured by which mode of existence.74 While
it may be said that Thomas’s distinctions between the three modes may be lacking (he is
apparently borrowing from “others”), he in no way concludes that there are only two modes of
existence.75
This is not to say that his explications of all three modes of existence are easy to follow.
The clearest explanation that he gives for the medieval concept of æviternity is a simple
explanation that may or may not explain much of anything at all when he says that “[æ]viternity
differs from time and from eternity as the mean between them both.”76 But what does he mean:
“the mean between them both?” While it is hard to get at the exact meaning, it appears that St.
Thomas is doing his level best to explain what defies explanation in human language. He seems
to vacillate between positing simultaneous-wholeness to æviternal existence on the one hand
and, on the other, positing contingency and changeability.
Even so, perhaps we can get a proto view of what Thomas is trying to capture in his
view on æviternal existence. To do this, let us think back to Matthew 22 in which Jesus states
that at the resurrection we are to be made like the angels in Heaven. This engenders at least two
probing questions. First, what kind of existence do the angels have and, second, what manner of
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existence will human beings have post-resurrection if we are to be like the angels? I take it that
Christ was almost certainly not indicating a disembodied existence (after all, on the Christian
account, the resurrection is a bodily one); however, might He be indicating something more than
the mere fact that humans will not be married like the angels are not married? Perhaps N.T.
Wright is onto something when he says that:
Neither here nor anywhere else in the early Christian literature is it suggested that
resurrected people have turned into angels. They are like them, as a trombone is
like an oboe in that both are wind instruments though one is made of brass and the
other of wood.77
Aquinas, himself, adds further potential insight into his idea of æviternal existence when
he says:
Spiritual creatures as regards successive affections and intelligences are measured
by time. Hence also Augustine says, that to be moved through time is to be
moved by affections. But as regards their natural being they are measured by
æviternity; as regards vision of glory, however, they have a share in eternity.78
Could it not be said then, that this explanation might be the explanation of human beings’ mode
of existence after the resurrection? To explain more fully what Thomas is saying here, and to
perhaps nuance some of the tricky language, let me simply restate some of the elements. We can
restate æviternal existence (Æ) in the following way:
(Æ): Spiritual creatures (all creatures having personal relationships with God) will
always grow in their knowledge of God and their affections toward Him.
These growths in knowledge as well as the decisions made by man and
angels are measured and will always be measured by time; however, for
Christian human beings, in their relational status, though they grow closer
and closer to Christ, their sanctification and glorification are completed at
death allowing them to behold glory with unveiled faces.79
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This completed sanctification and glorification, the Christian human beings’s natural being, is
not measured by time because it does not fade away: it is æviternal. This, of course, speaks more
to the transformation of the human being than it does to anything else; but it seems to also
describe a similar current status of the angels.80
Completed sanctification (whereby the human has been made holy) and glorification
(whereby the human has been made capable to inhabit the best of all creatable worlds and see
Christ without an epistemological and relational “veil”) are two parts of the salvation process
that Christian theism requires in order for human beings to find themselves in Heaven. Hence
Jerry Walls states: “That is why salvation must involve changing us so that we come to love God
as we ought. The aim of salvation is to make us holy, and this is what fits us for Heaven.”81
This is why it is fitting to list completed sanctification and glorification as necessary and
sufficient conditions for æviternal existence and so also (LAD) which states:
(LAD): The sort of paradisiacal state in which life is in its fullness and perfected.
With respect to the implications of æviternal existence on the mode of existence in Hell
(and being cast out of the presence of God), perhaps it is plausible to say that the æviternal
existence obtains for those resurrected to the second death, but that the quality of that existence

that sanctification and glorification are completed at death. Rather he posits Purgatory as a state between Heaven
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will be ever-increasingly horrible and without hope. Or, perhaps those resurrected to the second
death will be forever trapped in the hopelessness of time without partaking in the consummation
and making-right of all things, including the harsh gnawing of time.
There are then two major principles to take into the next chapter. First (1), God’s
existence as a timeless eternal existence will be discussed by way of arguments against. This
should allow for more explication on the broad sweeping strokes that abound in the previous
pages of this paper. Again, arguing for God’s timeless existence is crucial for the SR theory
because without the ontological grounding of God’s atemporal existence, no atemporal existence
is possible. (PR9), (PR10), (CR4), (CR5), and (SR) all require the possibility of atemporal
existence.82 Without the possibility of atemporality, SR cannot get off the ground.
Second (2), God’s atemporal existence necessitating a B-series view of time will be
attacked and defended, thereby showing that if the B-series of time is coherent so too is God’s
atemporal existence. Again, various premises in the SR argument require a B-series view of
time. Without B-series time being coherent, SR cannot get off the ground.
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CHAPTER THREE
Criticisms of Aquinas’s View of God’s Eternal Mode of Existence

Before an argument in favor of what I am calling “Simultaneous Resurrection” can be
fleshed out, there are two main items that need to be addressed, namely,
I.

Defending the atemporalist’s view of an eternal God and

II.

Defending the B-series theory of time as it is seemingly correlative and essentially
involved with the reality of God’s being atemporal.

While it is not my intention to destroy all potential defeaters to I and II, I do wish to argue that I
and II are coherent. Moreover, I hope to show that they do not lead to internal contradictions
and, instead, offer a basis for rational belief in God’s having an atemporal mode of existence.
The atemporal mode of existence is required for (PR1), (PR2), and (CR3), thus, we now turn to a
defense of God’s having this mode of existence.83

Defending God’s Atemporal Existence
The idea of an eternal God is fraught with all sorts of theo-philosophical hang-ups, and
difficulties abound. These are a few such questions. Can God act in time? Does God know what
time it is? Does God live in a static instant or is His future and being dynamic, moving ever
forward? What about God’s quality of life? What sort of effects does an understanding of God
as atemporal have on understandings of His incarnation in Jesus and His traditional traits like
83
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omniscience, omnipotence, omnipresence and personhood? Often, these sorts of questions are
raised in the form of objections. In order to keep the grounding of SR intact, I will begin to
defend the notion of God’s atemporal existence against such objection. To do this, I will attempt
to address the arguments undergirding these questions and, as an added bonus, will deal with
some less obvious arguments by way of dealing with the more obvious ones.
In the preceding chapter, a classic objection by Anthony Kenny was raised. This
objection argues that the transitivity of simultaneity leads to the incoherent idea that, if all
temporal events are simultaneous to God, all events are temporally present. By looking at the
transitivity objection addressed by Richard Cross (a restatement of an argument by Duns Scotus,
one of Aquinas’s medieval contemporaries and forerunner to Kenny’s objection) in “Duns
Scotus on Eternity and Timelessness,” we can view the argument in the following way: If we
accept
(A) All temporal things are eternally present to God,84
(B) If x is present to y, then both x and y are present, and
(C) It is not the case that the whole of flowing time is present,
we can then see that (A) actually entails the falsity of (C) which in turn entails
(1) All things are temporally present.85
(1) of course is false; thus, the transitivity objection. Explicitly, the objection is that if (A)
entails (1), then (A) is also assumed to be false. But does (A) entail (1)? It does not seem so. To
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see why not, it will help to make (B), an ambiguous premise, clearer. In order to strengthen the
argument, perhaps we can reword (B) in the following way:
(B*) If x is present to y and y is present to z, then x and y are both present to z.
The point of the original (B) premise is to show a symmetry and transitivity between
simultaneously present events to a third party (represented by z in (B*)); however, (B*) might
articulate the point more clearly.86 With (B*) in hand, perhaps we can look back at each premise
in the above argument. For the atemporalist (A) and (C) are true and the conclusion, (1), is false.
What about that new premise, (B*)? While (B*) more clearly explains the transitivity of
simultaneity than (B), it does not do not explain quite as well just what species of simultaneity is
being addressed. Perhaps a further clarification of (B*) might be accomplished in one of the
following ways:
(B**) If x is temporally present to y and y is temporally present to z, then x and y
are both temporally present to z or
(B***) If x and y are eternally present to z, then x and y are both eternally present.
It should be fairly obvious by looking at the differences in (B**) and (B***), that if (B***) were
to be added into the above argument it would then entail the falsity of (1), thus saving the
atemporalist’s view. The transitivity and symmetry of premise (B) is rendered false in that a
limitless relatum has been entered into the equation thereby negating transitivity.87 This insight,
in addition to the previously stated insights from Stump and Kretzmann in chapter two,88 should
complete a thorough working over of the standard Scotus and Kenny objection just seen. Suffice
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it to say, all temporal things might be present to eternity without it following that they are
temporally present.89 On both the Stump/Kretzmann view and the Scotus view, on which Cross
is expanding, “eternity is sufficient to block the inference from the simultaneity of all temporal
items with God to the simultaneity of all temporal items with each other.”90 With the transitivity
objection addressed, I will now discuss God’s essential “omni-properties” and how they might be
affected.
I take it for granted that God’s omni-properties can be reduced to His omnipotence. So,
when asking whether or not certain of God’s omni-properties might be “diminished” or affected
in some way by an atemporal existence, the question is really about whether or not God’s power
is somehow “diminished” or affected on such a conception. William Lane Craig offers one such
objection regarding God’s knowledge with respect to tensed propositions. He states rather
plainly that, on the atemporalist conception, there are perhaps limitless facts (tensed facts) to
which God is ignorant; he says: “[t]emporal persons know that the Japanese attack on Pearl
Harbor is over; God [if atemporal] has no idea whether it has occurred or not…He merely knows
that for people on December 8, 1941, and thereafter, it is a fact that the attack is over” and so
“[s]ince he does not know what time it actually is, he does not know any tensed facts.”91 Further
for Craig: “This is an unacceptably limited field of knowledge to qualify as omniscience.” How
is the atemporalist to respond to this kind of charge? Here Paul Helm is particularly helpful. He
states: “It might be argued that the failure of a timeless God to ‘know’ tensed facts is not a
failure of knowledge-that but of know-how, of divine power, just as a failure to smell the
89
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characteristic smell of Marmite while knowing its chemical composition is not a case of
ignorance but a lack of know-how, the ability to discriminate immediately the smell of Marmite
from, say, the smell of honey.”92 What Helm is saying, in effect, is that this particular situation
is similar to age-old conundrums such as whether or not God can commit deicide. The same way
God cannot commit deicide is the same way He cannot know tensed facts in the way Craig,
presumably, thinks He should.
There are, it seems, more propositions than time-tensed propositions that God does not
know. For instance, God cannot know person-perspectival truths such as “I am hungry” or “I
slept in late,” etc. It seems doubtful that Craig would think God lacked knowledge because God
does not know the proposition “I was born in Honolulu, Hawaii on April 2, 1981.” God of
courses knows that I was born on that date and in that location, but He does not know that
proposition from the first-person perspective. There seems to be no problem or lack in God’s
power due to the fact that God lacks the knowledge that only I have. Presumably there are then
billions upon billions of facts just like that that God does not know. Does that make Him
somehow less powerful? I do not see why. It surely does not follow that God’s “failure” to
know such person-perspectival truths results in a diminution of His divine power. All that is
entailed by God’s failure to have this sort of knowledge is that God does not violate the law of
identity. In order to know the proposition “I was born in Honolulu, Hawaii on April 2, 1981”
God would have to be me in my being and existence. If that were the case, God would not be
God; He would be me.
God, of course, cannot both be me and not me in the same time and in the same way by
rule of logic. Does God’s ignorance of billions of “I am” statements un-define the classic
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definition of God’s omniscience? I take it that the answer is no, and here is why: if God knows
the truth value of all propositions and believes only true ones, then it can accurately be stated that
God has knowledge that of all propositions. We can look at it this way: suppose I were to say “I
am hungry.” God knows that I am hungry, but He has a different sort of knowledge that I do.
Though I would know the truth-value of that proposition experientially, God knows the truthvalue of that proposition as a state of affairs, and the state of affairs is the exact same regardless
of how it is stated. So,

α: I am hungry (my knowledge of the experience) is the material equivalent of
β: J.T. is hungry (God’s (and any third party) “knowledge that” of my
experience).
These are just two different ways of expressing the exactly the same fact: the entity known as
“J.T.” is hungry.
If the above is correct, it does not seem difficult to imagine that, while God knows the
truth-value of the state of affairs: “the attack on Pearl Harbor is now over,” He could have a nonexperiential knowledge of that state of affairs (i.e. God does not experience the fact in time)
without it diminishing His omniscience. While those who experienced it might express the fact,
“The attack on Pearl Harbor concluded on December 7, 1941,” in various ways, God knows
exactly the same fact that they do. The only difference is that if God is atemporal, He did not
experience it in the same way that the temporal beings did in 1941. So the argument that God’s
omniscience is somehow limited by God’s atemporal existence is negated. Many other
arguments regarding God’s omniscience seem to be right along these same lines, and they all fail
for similar reasons.93
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Even so, perhaps a prudent question to ask is this: even if we are justified in “limiting”
God to propositional knowledge, is God’s relational ability, then, some how lacking? Does God,
so conceived, lose His personality, His personhood? Even more to the point, if God only has
propositional knowledge, are human beings just objects to God rather than subjects? I do not see
why that would follow. Firstly, it seems appropriate to say that most of a human being’s
knowledge of other persons is propositional in largely the same way that God’s knowledge of
human beings is propositional. Relational knowledge between persons, it seems to me, is more
about alignment and knowledge of their wills and affections, which are matters of the heart, than
about the number of propositions they know about each other. In the same way, God’s
relationship with mankind is defined, identified, and cultivated in the alignment of the human’s
will with God’s. In that way, there is knowledge of the heart that is not limited to the
propositional. Further, it is important to note that the personhood of God the Father is something
of a mystery. After all, the one through whom we relate with the Father is, in fact, a human
person: the God-man, Jesus Christ.
The possibility of atemporal propositional knowledge in the divine mind, however, does
not entirely eliminate the difficulties in reconciling God’s omniscience and His atemporal
existence. If God’s creation not only can change but is essentially changing and potential, then is
it not also true that God must be in some way changing along with His creation even if only by
virtue of His ever changing knowledge of changing individuals? Here is an example. It appears,
prima facie, that if God knows at t1 that Jones is not swimming but then knows differently at t2,
then God’s knowledge of Jones must have changed and, therefore, brought God into time. Put
another way, God would have to know the state of affairs concerning Jones at t1 and also see and
the following: “Therefore, if God is omniscient, theism is false; and if theism is true, God is not omniscient.” Pg.
421. Paul Helm deals with the absurdity of this kind of an argument in “Timelessness and Foreknowledge,” Mind
Association, 84 (October, 1975): 516-527.
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know that the state of affairs concerning Jones changes at t2. It seems to follow; therefore, that
as Jones changes so, too, does God’s knowledge of Jones.
It should be clear, ceteris paribus, that such an argument falls short of tripping up the
atemporalist understanding of God’s omniscience and immutability. Remember, Thomas says
that “although contingent things [or events/actions] become actual successively, nevertheless
God knows contingent things not successively, as they are in their own being, as we do, but
simultaneously”94 because “God sees not only the being they [contingent facts and entities] have
in their causes but also the being that they have in themselves in so far as His eternity is present
in its indivisibility to all time.”95 Here Thomas presents quite a difficult concept because the
human mind is deeply entrenched in successive thoughts and thought formulation. Change is
something that seems essential to the human understanding of knowledge.
In epistemological discussions, philosophers invariably discuss their methodologies and
how exactly they came sequentially to any justified true belief or any sense of warrant.
However, for God, this analogue seems nearly vacuous. Given the nature of the discussion, God
is to be thought of as containing all knowledge in His divine mind limitlessly and eternally
without ever having to index, categorize, or sequence His thoughts. God’s thoughts do not
change; He simply knows. It is true that God’s creation changes in time, but that particular
change is not intrinsic to God in any way, it is extrinsic, perhaps, but the change is only intrinsic
to the temporal individual thing that is changing.96 William Lane Craig argues that a notion of
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extrinsic change is in some sense a “weaker” view of immutability.97 This bit of nitpicking
aside, what seems patently obvious is that immutability can only recognize extrinsic change
since, by definition, that which is strongly immutable will never suffer intrinsic change. Further,
it does not seem helpful to discuss such a thing as “extrinsic” change with regards God. While it
can be said that His creation changes, the fact that, on an atemporalist view, God beholds the
totality of each individual’s being all at once negates any possibility for God to experience any
kind of change, even extrinsically. Yes, God can be said to know that Jones changes from t1 to
t2; however, God does not experience that change. God simply knows, in the eternal present, the
fact that events occur for Jones at t1 and t2. This is not to say that God does not experience
Jones. It is quite plausible and likely that if God is a person, as Christians believe, then God does
have relational experience with Jones, only atemporally so. It does not follow, however, that
God’s relational experience with Jones is very much at all like our own, human-to-human,
experience with Jones.
If God’s eternality, immutability, and His omniscience can all remain compatible, then
what kinds of implications are there for an eternal God acting in time with His creation? Does
this not contradict both His immutability and thereby His atemporal existence? There are a few
possible reasons why one might think there is inherent incoherence in the idea of a timeless deity
acting within time. First, one might assume that just as an eternal entity cannot exist in time, so
also an eternal entity cannot act in time. Second, it might also seem that temporal actions
necessarily have temporal causal agents and third, an atemporal being cannot hold together the
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existence of anything temporal because doing so would require that the atemporal being have
temporal duration.98
Nelson Pike offers a classic version for the second reason for rejecting an atemporal
being’s acting in time:
Let us suppose that yesterday a mountain, 17,000 feet high, came into existence
on the flatlands of Illinois. One of the local theists explains this occurrence by
reference to divine creative action. He claims that God produced (created,
brought about) the mountain. Of course, if God is timeless, He could not have
produced the mountain yesterday. This would require that God’s creative-activity
and thus the individual whose activity it is have position in time. The theist’s
claim is that God timelessly brought it about that yesterday, a 17,000 feet high
mountain came into existence on the flatlands of Illinois…[But] the claim that
God timelessly produced a temporal object (such as the mountain) is absurd.99
At this point Eleonore Stump and Norman Kretzmann prove tremendously helpful. In their
opinion there is great confusion in all three of the considerations that argue against an atemporal
being’s acting in time.100 The first consideration brings with it confusion over whether an
atemporal being’s actions can be located in time or whether the effect of their actions can be
located in time.101 There seems to be no contradiction in asserting that the effects of an eternal
being’s actions can find location in time whereas there most definitely is a contradiction if one is
to say that the eternal being’s actions are similarly located.102 If indeed there is no contradiction
for an atemporal being’s actions to have effects in time, then for an omnipotent being, such a
situation is not at all outside the realm of possibility.
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Paul Helm echoes a similar point when he makes the distinction between time and
contingency:
There is a tendency to confuse time with contingency. Scripture implies, if not
affirms, the contingency of the universe in two respects: that its existence is not
logically necessary, and that it owes its existence to the agency of God – it
depends on Him. But it does not follow from the contingency of the universe in
these senses that there was a time when the world was not, only that there might
not have been a universe.103
Helm’s insight should give us adequate pause when considering whether or not Pike’s argument
is well founded. That said, with regard to Pike’s objection, there might yet be room for the
objector to say that an atemporal being’s actions cannot have temporal effects. Stump and
Kretzmann reformulate Pike’s basic argument thusly:
(9)

“If God is timeless, He could not have produced the mountain yesterday.

(10)

The claim that God timelessly produced a temporal object (such as the
mountain) is absurd.”104

Because Stump and Kretzmann see Pike’s (9) and (10) as rather ambiguous they clarify with four
possibilities:
(9a)

If God is atemporal, he cannot yesterday have brought it about that a
temporal object came into existence.

(9b)

If God is atemporal, he cannot (atemporally) bring it about that a temporal
object came into existence yesterday.

(10a) It is absurd to claim that God atemporally brings it about that a temporal
object came into existence.
(10b) It is absurd to claim that God brings it about that a temporal object came
into existence atemporally.105
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Clearly both (9a) and (10b) are true and, as Stump and Kretzmann note, Pike seems to be
intending (9a) and (10b) instead of their (9) and (10).106 The problem for Pike is that, while (9a)
and (10b) are indeed impossible for an atemporal God, there is not much by way of consideration
or argument to explain why (9b) or (10a) is similarly impossible.
Is there some necessary condition in causality that requires a temporal effect to have a
temporal cause? Though this is more commonly seen in temporal life, there does not seem to be
anything logically or metaphysically contradictory about positing different types of cause and
effect relationships (e.g. atemporal causes and temporal effects).107 In effect, the first two
considerations can be rejected because, while (9a) and (10b) are true, (9b) and (10a) are false or
at least have not at all been proven. Perhaps a plausible defense can be given for (9b) and (10a)
if there exists some kind of cause and effect that must be temporally simultaneous (perhaps there
are some examples like that; it could be that mountain creation is one of them). Stump and
Kretzmann correctly point out that if the necessity of temporal simultaneity is being argued by
Pike, and others who might launch the same critique with respect to cause and effect
relationships, then it completely begs the question. Further, if simultaneity simpliciter is needed
in some cause and effect relationships (including mountain creation), then via ET-simultaneity it
can easily be said that all temporal actions (i.e. cause and effect relationships) have ETsimultaneity with their eternal causes.108 Additionally, because the first two considerations are
defeated, so too, is the third. If it is the case that an atemporal being can have its effects happen

106

Ibid., 449.

107

What about temporal causes and atemporal effects? Does the temporal work of man influence the æviternal
existence? See APPENDIX: Causality.
108

Ibid., 450.

49

in time, then that same atemporal being can have the effect of sustaining temporal individuals in
time.109
At this point, I will remind the reader why a defense of God’s atemporal existence is
being made. Remember that most of the premises of the argument for SR rely heavily the fact
that there is such a thing as atemporal existence. It follows that if God is not atemporal, then
nothing is since God is the grounding of all reality. Accordingly, if God is not atemporal, then
discussion of the æviternal existence is meaningless. To that end, I have attempted to defend
God’s eternality, omniscience, and immutability. That said, the only other specific omniproperty that is left to be discussed is omnipresence.
Richard La Croix thinks that God’s omnipresence renders Thomas’ idea of God’s eternal
existence incoherent.110 He says:
…if God is indeed omnipresent then it would appear that he must have been in the
United Nations Building yesterday as well as the day before yesterday. And if
God was in the United Nations Building both yesterday and the day before, then it
would appear that he is in time and that temporal predications do actually apply to
him. So, it would appear that God is not a timeless being if he is omnipresent and
that two doctrines crucial to the theology of Aquinas (or any eternalist) are
logically incompatible.111
Are the classic positions of God’s omnipresence and His eternal atemporal existence really
logically incompatible as La Croix thinks they are? To see why not, let us examine his argument
premise by premise. It goes this way:
P1:

If God is omnipresent then God was in the United Nations Building
yesterday.
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P2:

If God is omnipresent then God was in the United Nations Building the
day before yesterday.

C1:

God was in the United Nations Building yesterday and the day before
yesterday (from the conjunction of P1 and P2).

C2:

Therefore, God is in time and not timeless.

The argument is most definitely cogent. After all, the conclusion follows with high probability,
at least prima facie, from P1 through P2. However, is the argument strong? The answer must be
a resounding “no”! Simply put, both premises are false. God was not, in fact, in the United
Nations Building yesterday, the day before, or today. God, it might said, is not actually
anywhere. God is an in-corporeal being. God does not have location.112
What is more, if La Croix is going to accuse Thomas of committing a logical
contradiction in his views of God’s timelessness and omnipresence, then La Croix ought to
consider what Thomas says regarding God’s omnipresence in particular:
…in some way God is in every place, and this is to be everywhere. First, as He is
in all things as giving them being, power, and operation, so He is in every place as
giving it being and power to be in a place. Again, things placed are in place in so
far as they fill a place: and God fills every place; not, indeed, as a body, for a
body is said to fill place in so far as it excludes the presence of another body; but
by God being in a place, others are not thereby excluded from it; rather indeed,
He Himself fills every place by the very fact that He gives being to the things that
fill every place.113
It appears fairly obvious that Thomas is being metaphorical and analogical by saying things like
“He is in every place,” “fills every place,” etc. Since omnipresence is a negation, in the sense
that omnipresence really means, “not limited by space or location,” it follows that what Aquinas
expresses is merely the fact that God sustains everyone and everything. If that is the case, then
La Croix’s argument is similar in scope to the objection already handled concerning God’s
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eternal actions having temporal effects. This is particularly true with respect to an atemporal
entity upholding a temporal entity. The argument against omnipresence simply reduces to an
argument against God’s actions having their effect in time (and we have already seen that the
latter fails). So then, if the omni-properties of God can be defended in an atemporal account of
God’s existence, the SR argument remains plausible.

Condition (ii) Revisited
It was mentioned previously (in chapter two) that we would need to revisit the claim by
Stump and Kretzmann, in condition (ii) of their ET-simultaneity formula, that there must be an
observer in the eternal reference frame who observes a temporal event (either x or y) as being
temporally present. More specifically condition (ii) is stated this way:
(ii) for some observer, A, in the unique eternal reference frame, x and y are both
present – i.e., either x is eternally present and y is observed as temporally
present, or vice versa.
Not only does Craig call Stump and Kretzmann’s definition of ET-simultaneity vacuous on
condition (ii),114 Paul Helm, Stump and Kretzmann’s fellow atemporalist, also finds this
particular condition of the ET-simultaneity theory to be “obscure.”115 Unfortunately, neither
Stump nor Kretzmann have gone on to defend this particular condition involved in ETsimultaneity, so speculation seems to be the operative approach at this juncture.116
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The appropriate question then is this: “what does it mean for God, the eternal entity, to
observe an action (either x or y) as temporally present?” Quite simply, it seems to mean that God
knows that a particular action is temporally present relative to a temporal observer. Since God is
omniscient, He knows full-well all the temporal reference frames (though He does not
experience these temporal reference frames, He does know who is experiencing them and what
data they are receiving) and so He knows exactly what events can be said to be temporally
present as they are temporally present to temporal individuals. There is, however, one corollary
to this argument that Garrett DeWeese addresses. He says this:
What would it mean to say that B observes (or perceives) an event or an entity as
eternally present? It is clear, assuming a causal theory of perception, that
temporal beings can only perceive events or entities within their past lightcones—that is, events or entities, by definition, do not exist in the temporal series.
Given that time and eternity are different modes of existence, how can a temporal
being observe an event in a timeless mode of being?117
Simply put, this question is wrong-headed. The inherent difficulty in the wording of (ii)
notwithstanding, it seems completely far-fetched to assume that Stump and Kretzmann refer to
“observation” in a strict visual or auditory sense whereby “light-cones” or other such
accoutrement would at all be needed. Further, no such actual observer needs to exist since these
thought experiments are merely hypothetical. However, if it did need a particular temporal
“observer” one might say that a “rock” is an observer qualified enough to help in the particular
condition given for ET-simultaneity. All that condition (ii) is really asking for is an event
occurring in a temporal reference frame relative to one of the many temporal reference frames
and occurring simultaneously to the one eternal reference frame.118 If a tree falls in the woods in
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temporal reference frame x with no sentient observer, it could still be said that its falling had ETsimultaneity with the eternal present of God. A correct understanding of Stump and
Kretzmann’s wording and intent appears to be all that is needed.
At any rate, it seems that most detractors cannot positively say that the ET-simultaneity
theory is incoherent; perhaps they might simply say that they have a hard time understanding
it.119 In all honesty, statements that assert that ET-simultaneity is difficult to comprehend only
against the above types of objections, it is now time to address God’s occurrence in time as the
man, Jesus Christ.

The Problem and Solution of Jesus Christ
When God incarnated Himself in time as the man, Jesus Christ, did He not step into time
and thereby negate His atemporal and immutable existence? Admittedly this is a tricky question
and probably one well beyond my ken; nevertheless, because it is an appropriate question and
objection to God’s eternal existence it must be addressed. Certainly it can be said that God did
come in the form of man in the fullness of time (Gal 4:4). However, does that mean that God in
His deity became temporal? Scripture does, after all, say that in Christ the “fullness of God was
pleased to dwell” (Col 1:19). So then, if the fullness of God is pleased to dwell in the temporal
Christ, is it not the case that God is then bound by time and therefore temporal? If the
atemporalist takes the hypostatic union seriously, then the answer to the previous question might
well be “no.”
Keeping in mind that Jesus Christ has two full, yet distinct, natures, there then must be
attributes that can be attributed solely to Christ’s deity and other attributes solely to his
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humanity. For instance: Jesus Christ in His humanity needed to sleep, eat, bathe, exercise, etc;
however, Jesus Christ in His deity does not need to do those things; rather, He is completely
sustained by His perfect relationship with the Father. So too it might be suggested that Jesus
Christ in His humanity is bound to a temporal existence and not so in His divinity.120 While this
may answer one question, it does not answer the question of how God became human. Does
God becoming human not imply the negation of God’s immutability on account of the change
that accompanies becoming? If it does imply the negation of immutability, then it also will
imply the negation of God’s eternal existence (as defined atemporally) because by definition that
which changes is measured by time.121 While this topic is nearly inexhaustible and deserves a
more thorough look than is available in this project, I take it that the atemporalist can give a
cogent response to this objection.
Suppose that it might be said of Jesus Christ that He exists atemporally in an incarnate
state. Notice that this does not say “Jesus Christ has always existed in an incarnate state.” The
latter could be false while the former remains true. In other words, the physical body of Jesus
Christ, in either its pre-resurrection state or post-resurrection state, did not exist prior to His
earthly and temporal incarnation; rather, He exists atemporally in His resurrected state. Put
another way, Christ’s pre-resurrection incarnation occurs temporally and his resurrection body
exists atemporally. If these statements are coherent, and I take it that they are, then it seems that
God’s atemporal existence has been cogently defended (though perhaps not ultimately as the
debate still rages). This includes, I take it, a coherent understanding of the temporal incarnation
of Jesus Christ. As a corollary to God’s being atemporal and God’s incarnation in time in the
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man, Jesus Christ, it seems fitting to address God’s particular mode of existence, viz., whether
God’s mode of existence is in the A-Series (dynamic) or B-Series (static) view of time.

God’s Static Existence
Given all that has been said in this chapter, it seems the only thing left to discuss is
whether or not the type of life that God lives is one of stasis or one of dynamics. While A-series
view of time may be coherent, it does not seem to allow for the atemporal simultaneity of death
and resurrection. Therefore, A-series is not being rejected because it is incoherent, but because it
answers eschatological questions unsatisfactorily. If A-series is correct, then we have serious
hermeneutical problems in Scripture with regard to resurrection as is noted in chapter one. I take
it to be clear that my arguments for God’s eternal existence must be in light of a B-series view of
time. The B-series view of time does not sit well for some philosophers because they assume it
will lead to a quality of life not fit for the most perfect being:
What exactly is the alternative to our present mode of existence that we are being
invited to consider?...What I’m being asked to imagine is that all I would ever
experience would be just one momentary slice out of my present life…it seems
mad to me to suppose that such a life would be preferable to my actual [dynamic]
life.122
Why such a negative reaction to the static view of time? Yes, stasis does seem to have
rather boring and unfulfilling connotations with it (perhaps analogous to a job where one literally
did the same thing day in and day out), but it does not seem quite correct to assume of an
atemporal deity, in whom rests the perfection and whole of being, that the quality of His
existence might suffer. Ironically, William Lane Craig comes to the aid of the atemporalist in
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this discussion: “Even if my life is better temporal than atemporal, that is irrelevant to whether
God’s life is better temporal than atemporal…Even if creaturely life is better temporal than
atemporal, that says nothing about the life of an infinite, uncreated being.”123 This is why the
“duration of a special sort” is noted chapter two. God’s static existence seems altogether
different than the normal idea that temporal individuals have in their mind when they think of a
static, changeless existence. To the temporal and contingent creature, most of what they know is
change and changing. There is an unquenchable desire and need to grow and learn and change
and experience. God has no potentiality, so the idea of change and dynamics as humans know it
is something completely other to Him. What exactly it (God’s static existence) is most likely
cannot be adequately expressed in temporal and finite language, but God, who is all in all and
lacks nothing has more of a fulfilling experience, one would imagine, than any we will ever
have. Still, though, He retains His personality and relationality with humanity through His
dynamic existence in God the Son, Jesus Christ.
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CHAPTER FOUR
How Tota Simul Affects the Resurrection of the Dead

At this point, it should be clear that the idea of a timeless God as the grounding of reality
is not only logically coherent, but plausibly true. Because of this, we can now focus our
attention on the main thesis of this project. It must be remembered, going forward, that the aim
of this paper is to shed philosophical light onto the contents of such Scripture passages as
Matthew 22:29-33, Exodus 3:6, and Luke 23:43 by describing what I have been calling
“Simultaneous Resurrection.” Simultaneous Resurrection, if you will recall, is simply the theory
that, given the truth of the Christian understanding of physical resurrection, when a person dies
that same person simultaneously experiences resurrection life in the resurrected world, (i.e.
(LAD)).124 Before we explicate what this might coherently mean, it is helpful to look again at
some of the passages in question.
In Matthew 22:29-33, the context of Jesus’ argument is the literal and physical
resurrection of the dead:
But Jesus answered them [the Sadducees], “You are wrong, because you know
neither the Scriptures nor the power of God. For in the resurrection they [the
resurrected] neither marry nor are given in marriage, but are like the angels in
heaven. And as for the resurrection of the dead, have you not read what was said
to you by God: ‘I am the God of Abraham, and the God of Isaac, and the God of
Jacob’? He is not God of the dead, but of the living.” And when the crowd heard
it, they were astonished at his teaching.125
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In Exodus 3:6 (the verse Jesus quotes in the above passage) God makes the following statement
to Moses:
And he [God] said, “I am the God of your father, the God of Abraham, the God of
Isaac, and the God of Jacob.”126
What exactly is Christ implying in Matthew 22:29-33? Is He implying that Abraham, Isaac, and
Jacob were resurrected all the way back in Exodus 3:6? If He is, that certainly does not seem to
be the popular view. In fact, it seems that the scholars on the cutting edge of resurrection
scholarship have an a priori assumption that, while Christ is addressing physical resurrection
here, he is not at all implying that Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob have already, temporally,
resurrected.127 We can take it to be the case, then, that Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob, at the time
God spoke to Moses, had not yet temporally resurrected. Yet, we can also take it to be the case
(at least, we can take it to be the case if the notion of an atemporal, timeless God is coherent) that
the past, present, and future all have existence to God as a simultaneous-whole. What we must
now investigate are the ontological implications of God’s simultaneously-whole existence on
human (temporal) resurrection. Put another way, we must answer the following question: “If a
person’s post-resurrection self is atemporally simultaneous to God, how then does that affect the
person’s post-resurrection existence?”
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It seems to me that the answer to this question will be found in the æviternal mode of
existence (Æ). This is the mode of existence that we discussed in chapter two.128 It is
summarized as follows:
(Æ): Spiritual creatures (all creatures having personal relationships with God)
will always grow in their knowledge of God and their affections toward
Him. These growths in knowledge and the decisions made by man and
angels are measured and will always be measured by time; however, in their
relational status, though they grow closer and closer to Christ, their
sanctification and glorification are complete at death allowing them to
behold glory with unveiled faces. This completed sanctification and
glorification, their natural being, is not measured by time because it does not
fade away; it is æviternal.
This seems to be simpatico with the Thomistic definition of æviternal existence that those
existing in æviternity do not experience change of being.129 What I think Thomas is expressing
when he says that an æviternal entity is not “subject to change” is that if such an entity exists,
then this entity’s being must be essentially unchanging.130 Put another way, æviternal entities are
not subject to the change of their being. Even so, they can be subject to change in their
affections toward God and so, by that, be measured by time.
Suppose it is the case that a person, post temporal life, is æviternal. What follows from
this? (PR10) indicates the following:
(PR10): Because æviternal existence shares in God’s eternity, a human’s
æviternal existence includes experience of the temporal physical
resurrection event and so (LAD).
At minimum, two assumptions are made in (PR10):
(A1): Æviternal existence shares in God’s eternity and
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(A2): An æviternal being’s sharing in God’s eternity includes experience of the
temporal and physical resurrection (a requirement of (LAD)).
Given these two assumptions, I take it that two pressing questions could be asked. First, on what
grounds do we base the assertion that the æviternal being shares in God’s existence as (A1)
states? Secondly, regarding (A2), how does an æviternal being’s share in God’s eternity imply
that a resurrected person will actually experience her death and resurrection in a non-temporally
simultaneous way? In other words, why does it follow from God’s atemporal existence, and the
plausible idea of persons in the æviternal mode of existence, that the æviternal (resurrected)
person will in some sense already be experiencing resurrection life (LAD) in the reality of God’s
tota simul from the moment of death?
To begin to answer these questions, perhaps it might be best to unpack (A2) a little more,
and, in particular, (LAD). Recall that (LAD) is the sort of paradisiacal state in which life is at its
fullness and perfected. As I argued in chapter one, if the Thomistic account of the human being
is true (whereby human beings are only human beings when both body and soul are combined),
then it seems odd to assume that a paradisiacal state could include any state in which a human
being is not fully a human being. After all, if “Paradise” can be had without a body, then why
resurrect at all? Paradise, as I take it, is as (LAD) says: life in its fullness and perfected. If
Paradise can be had immediately upon death, as Jesus indicates in Luke 23, and it is the case that
Paradise can be had without a body, then resurrection seems completely superfluous. I take it
that on a conception where non-embodied existence allows for life in its fullness and perfected,
resurrection would be a meaningless addition.
What manner of thing is (LAD) implying then? Though (LAD) may only be stated
analogically, perhaps we can think of it as something akin to Jones’s waking up from death into a
world where he actually is living the resurrection life partaking in æviternity. So, something like
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Jones’s participation in the general resurrection of the dead (or resurrection of believers) will be
a past memory, but not in a temporal way.131 (Even though this thought project uses tensed
language, it cannot be taken too strictly. It should be clear that the idea I am trying to express
here is one in which Jones is, with fullness of being, present in the resurrected world and all
without any sort of “I am new here” feeling.) Again, Jones will not have always been
resurrected, for always is temporal; what I mean, instead, is Jones’s natural being will not have
experienced a passage of time.132 Now that I have established an idea of what (A2) asserts, we
can begin to discuss its plausibility; we can start by examining Thomas’s claim that those who
live the æviternal existence have a share in eternity.133
What does it mean to have a share in eternity? Jesus, after all, promises to those who will
resurrect to life that they will raise to eternal life (Matthew 25:46, John 3:16, etc.), so there must
be something to the claim that those resurrected will have a share in eternity. If what has been
argued so far is true (and I think that it is), I think we can best understand Jesus’ claims as an
indication that eternal life is the experience of the resurrected person in the remaining æviternal
“duration” of everlasting life. Further, if it is the case that the resurrected person’s natural being
(i.e. her sanctification and glorification) does not experience change, then it may be the case that
her natural being is sharing in eternity by virtue of being, in a particular sense, atemporal. In
other words, her natural being is no longer measured by time. If time is the measure of before
and after, and there no longer exists ‘before and after’ for the post-resurrected person in their
131
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natural being, then it follows that the post-resurrected person’s natural being is atemporal. It is
by this fact that the resurrected person has a share in eternity in a very real way. If this is true,
then (A1) is true.
La Croix, though he does not ultimately agree with Aquinas on the concept of æviternity,
is able to break down the distinction between that which is eternal and that which is æviternal:
It [æviternity] would be essentially different from time and so be timeless,
according to Aquinas, by virtue of the fact that [æviternity], like eternity, is tota
simul while time is not tota simul. It would be essentially different from eternity
on his view by virtue of the fact that it is possible for [æviternity] to be connected
to or associated with (conjungi) before and after or beginnings and ends while
before and after or beginnings and ends are not compatible (neque campatitur)
with eternity; that is, it is not possible for eternity to be in any way connected to
or associated with before and after or beginnings and ends. In short, time has
beginnings and ends in it, [æviternity] has no beginnings and ends in it though it
can be connected to or associated with them. It turns out, then, that on Thomas’s
view the necessary and jointly sufficient conditions that a measure must satisfy in
order to qualify as eternal are that the measure itself have neither a beginning nor
an end, that there be no beginnings and ends in the measure, and that it be
impossible for the measure to be in any way connected to or associated with
beginnings and ends…134
If La Croix is right, then it follows that æviternity does not have a beginning or ending in it. This
does not mean that the æviternal existence does not have some sense of a beginning to it; rather,
there are no beginnings and endings in it. More particularly, there are no beginnings and endings
in the natural being of the æviternal person. The unchanging natural being of the resurrected
person is simply the result of completed sanctification and glorification. In other words, ‘natural
being’ here is a relational term with respect to a person’s relationship to God. If justification is
already complete, and sanctification and glorification will be complete at the resurrection, then it
follows that the being of the resurrected person will, in a very real sense, be complete. This is
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then what it means to say that the natural being of the æviternal person has no beginning or end
in it but it has a beginning to it. It is a similar way that the resurrected person has a share in
eternity but is not in himself eternal; he is æviternal.135 Though La Croix’s (and so, likely,
Thomas’s) definition of æviternity seems to rule out entities who have temporal parts, it may be
the case that Aquinas’s understanding of the soul, as the substantial form of the human, gives the
conduit through which æviternal existence supervenes upon the human’s unchanging natural
being.136
Montague Brown also wishes to ascribe æviternal existence to the human at death. The
difference between La Croix and Brown, however, is that in Brown’s affirmation of Thomas’s
“temporary disembodiment” (as Brown calls it) theory of death and resurrection, is his insistence
that the human soul is æviternal.137 It needs to be remembered, however (and I think Brown
misses on this point), that, for Thomas, the human being does not exist if the form is separated
from the matter.138 If the previous statement is true, and matter (i.e. the body) is combined with
a now unchanging substantial form, the sanctified soul, it seems that the notion of an æviternal
human being is not only coherent, but quite plausible.139 Here is why: if a person is essentially
embodied, as Thomas thinks, and the physical æviternal existence is false, then at death human
beings are no longer human beings but must wait to become humans again at the future
resurrection.
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There is, however, at least one problem with the Thomistic view of things, as La Croix
(above) notes.140 Aquinas thinks that the æviternal being exists tota simul. But how can this be?
It is at this point that La Croix’s criticism of Aquinas seems spot on: “(with respect to time
measuring the affections of the æviternal being)…since changes do occur to [æviternal] things
and those changes are measured by time and occur in time because they begin and end in time, it
would appear to follow that…time and [æviternity] are not mutually exclusive.”141 If time and
æviternity are not mutually exclusive, then this means that æviternity cannot be tota simul since
tota simul and time are indeed mutually exclusive. The whole point of the simultaneously-whole
existence is to free God from the bondage of time. Any creature who exists in a simultaneouslywhole existence therefore will also be free from time, but there is only one eternal being, God.142
(It is important to remember at this point that, although æviternal beings share in eternity, they
are not eternal in the way we have been using ‘eternal’ throughout this project. Eternity is the
simultaneously-whole and perfect possession of interminable life; the æviternal being does not
have that, though it may be said that she has a diminished share of it.)
It does seem possible to give a critique concerning the æviternal entity’s atemporal
natural being (which makes the entity æviternal) and the ramifications atemporality has with
respect to existence tota simul. For example: it seems plainly obvious that if a being is in any
way atemporal, then, by necessity, it experiences life tota simul. However, if it is the case that
æviternal beings, by virtue of their atemporal natural being, have life tota simul, then this
objection creates a major problem for the plausibility of simultaneous resurrection into æviternal
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existence. Since it has already been determined that only one being can experience life tota
simul, namely, God who holds all temporal entities in His eternal present by virtue of His
timeless existence as well as His omnipotence, it follows that if æviternity necessitates existence
tota simul, then the concept of æviternity is faulty. Here is the objection, premise by premise:
(a)

Anything that is eternal is atemporal.

(b)

Anything that is æviternal is atemporal.

(c)

Anything that is atemporal exists in a simultaneously-whole existence.

(d)

x is atemporal; therefore,

(1)

x is simultaneously whole.

(2)

If x is eternal, then x is simultaneously-whole.

(3)

If x is æviternal, then x is simultaneously-whole.

The above argument appears valid, but if it is sound then the whole concept of æviternity, the
third mode of existence (a supposedly different mode) that leads to simultaneous resurrection, is
defeated. But is the argument sound? First, we know that the argument is valid since (1) follows
from (c) and (d), (2) follows from (a) and (d), and (3) follows from (b) and (d). Further, we
know that (2) and (3) indicate an equal mode of existence based on (a), (b), and (d). The only
hope then is that at least one of the premises is false.
So let us take each premise in turn. Premise (a) is true by definition.143 Premise (b), we
have seen, is true as well. Premise (c), it seems to me, is the hang-up. Premise (c) states:
(c)

Anything atemporal is in a simultaneously-whole existence.

Based on a straightforward definition of “atemporal,” (c) will most likely hold true if no
modification is made with respect to the nature of atemporality (definitions (a) and (b)). So far,
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what has been addressed in this project is the simple definition of “atemporal” whereby anything
that is “atemporal” exists completely outside of time, and, thus, (c).
It would be a mistake, however, not to mention that there is indeed an implicit difference
in eternal atemporality and æviternal atemporality. Ultimately, then, a modification is needed
not for only for (c) but also both (a) and (b).144 Let us modify them this way:
(a*)

A thing x is atemporal in the eternal sense iff
(M)

x is not measured by time and

(M1) x has no beginning and no ending and
(M2) x is immutable
and
(b*)

A thing x is atemporal in the æviternal sense iff
(N)

x is not measured by time and

(N1)

x has a beginning and no ending and

(N2)

x, though unchanging in natural being, is mutable.

As can be seen, it is by virtue of (M) that (a*) is atemporal and by virtue of (M1) and (M2) that
(a*) is eternal. Similarly, it is by virtue of (N) that (b*) is atemporal and by virtue of (N1) and
(N2) that (b*) is æviternal. All this really amounts to is that neither the eternal nor the æviternal
are measured by time. This should be obvious since eternity and æviternity are separate
measures of existence.145 Thus with these definitions in place, the concepts of æviternity and
æviternal existence appear to be logically coherent. If this concept is coherent, then SR’s
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premises (PR6) through (PR10) and conclusions (CR4) through (SR) are plausible and might
well be true.146
Let us suppose that SR is true. If SR is true, what follows with respect to the resurrection
of Christ? Does it follow that He resurrects into æviternal existence? If what I have argued so far
is true, and the hypostatic union is taken seriously, then it follows that the humanity of Jesus
Christ resurrects into an æviternal existence, while His divinity never fails to exist atemporally in
the eternal sense.
Finally, the coherence of the working theory of æviternal existence gives us the ability to
look back again to Stump and Kretzmann’s ET-simultaneity theory and its affects on the doctrine
of the resurrection of the dead. It is a truth of the Christian religion that the resurrection of the
dead at the return of Jesus Christ is a future temporal event. If that is the case, then that temporal
event is also ET-simultaneous to the eternal present of God. What is more, all temporal events
are that way.147 Suppose that Jones is a born-again Christian and he dies on February 12, 2012.
Let us also suppose that Jesus Christ returns for the consummation of His Church and restores
the world and His people through resurrection on April 2, 3015. Jones, then, dies on February 12,
2012 and resurrects on April 2, 3015. According to ET-simultaneity, both of these dates are
eternally present to God, who is fully ET-simultaneous with the whole of measured time (of
146
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which Jones’s death and resurrection are a part) and eternity.148 So then it would be true to say
that Jones’s death and his resurrection -- though separated temporally -- are ET-simultaneous to
God by virtue of God’s eternal existence.
From the preceding argument concerning the nature of æviternal existence, it might also
be fair to say that Jones, by virtue of resurrecting into æviternal existence, experiences
resurrection ET-simultaneous with his death (conclusion (SR)). Here is why it is fair to say this.
If it is true that the æviternal entity, Jones, has existence that shares in God’s eternity (though
æviternal beings are not eternal), and God is ET-simultaneous to Jones’s death and resurrection,
then it seems to follow that in some real sense Jones experiences the ET-simultaneity of his death
and resurrection. If Jones resurrects to æviternal existence, it is not that he then experiences
every temporal moment he has ever had as ET-simultaneous with his death; rather, he
experiences a share of God’s ET-simultaneity with respect to his resurrection since it is Jones’s
only next temporal moment. After all, Jones’s sharing in God’s ET-simultaneity is dependent on
his sharing in God’s eternity that only comes after Jones’s move from temporal being to
æviternal being. This does not negate the temporal resurrection of the dead Jones.
All that has been argued so far is that, by virtue of Jones’s æviternal existence, Jones
experiences (in his share of God’s eternity) his death and resurrection’s ET-simultaneity with
God. While some, like Trenton Merricks, may wish to claim a time-gap in the existence of a
human being at death, Simultaneous Resurrection posits not a gap, but ET-simultaneity.149 The
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same then might be argued in the case of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob as referenced by both God
the Son in Christ (Matthew 22) and by God the Son in the burning bush (Exodus 3:6). If it is
true that Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob resurrect into æviternal existence, then (if the argument
holds) it is also true that they are, in a very real sense, experiencing resurrection life, and so are
alive to God as God of the living and not of the dead.
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CHAPTER FIVE
Conclusion

With all of the arguments for the simultaneous-whole existence of God, his mode of
existence and its effect on other entities, and a proper understanding of æviternity, it seems that it
may be relevant to revisit the formally stated argument. The argument, formally stated, goes like
this:
(PR1): God exists in an atemporal, eternal, simultaneously-whole existence.
(PR2): Anything that exists in a simultaneously-whole existence simultaneously
experiences every temporal and eternal event and entity.
(PR3): Jones’s death and resurrection are temporal events to God and all who
know Jones.
(PR4): Jones participates in the temporal resurrection of believers by virtue of his
being a believer and by virtue of his temporal resurrection.
(PR5): Any entity that God is present to and has consciousness experiences the
“nowness” of God.
(PR6): It is possible that, though dead on this earth, a person continues on in
conscious fullness of being.
(PR7): At temporal death, if Jones is a disciple of Christ, then his sanctification
and glorification are complete.
(PR8): If Jones’s sanctification and glorification are complete, then his natural
being is not subject to change.
(PR9): Any being, other than God, whose natural being is not subject to change is
æviternal.
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(PR10): Because æviternal existence shares in God’s eternity, a human’s
æviternal existence includes experience of the temporal physical
resurrection event (LAD); therefore,
(CR1): Jones experiences the “nowness” of God when participating in the
resurrection of believers (from (PR1)-(PR5)).
(CR2): Jones experiences the “nowness” of God when he dies (from (PR1)(PR6)).
(CR3): God simultaneously experiences both Jones’s temporal death and temporal
resurrection (from (PR1)-(PR4)).
(CR4): If Jones is a believer and Jones is temporally dead, Jones is æviternal
(from (PR7)-(PR9)).
(CR5): If Jones is æviternal, Jones experiences (LAD) (from (PR1)-(PR11).
(SR): At temporal death, Jones then experiences æviternal (LAD) (from (CR1)-(CR5)).
As we said earlier, the argument in its current form appears to be logically valid; however, the
point and purpose for the heretofore discussion has been to demonstrate that the argument is not
only valid but, more importantly, sound. To see more clearly that this is the case, I will now
attempt to give an explicit defense of each premise starting with premise (PR1).
(PR1) is simply a restatement of Thomas’s definition of eternity that I have been using
throughout.150 Chapter three was my attempt to rigorously defend this definition against a
number of objections. The first objection that is thwarted is the argument from the transitivity of
simultaneity. Here I pointed out that Stump and Kretzmann’s theory of ET-simultaneity is of
tremendous help in that it allows for events to be simultaneous from two different reference
frames and, thereby, negates any notion of transitivity. The rejoinder to the transitivity objection
goes, basically this way. It is a negation of the idea that if x is simultaneous to y and y is
simultaneous to z, then x must be simultaneous to z. The crux of the argument hinges on a proper
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understanding of ‘simultaneous.’ When the atemporalist (such as Aquinas or any other
contemporary atemporalist) says “simultaneous” in the atemporal sense, what he really means is
not that x, y, and z all occur simultaneously in time; rather, what he means is that x, y, and z are
all simultaneously present to God who is in the eternal reference frame. If the transitivity
objection can be overturned, as I argued in the third chapter, then the simultaneity of a plurality
of different events, located at different times on the space-time continuum can be coherently said
to be occurring simultaneously to God in the eternal present. Cross, who has great insight
regarding the transitivity objection (as we above), also correctly points out that the matter of x, y,
and z’s being simultaneous to an eternal being is not the same as being simultaneous with each
other in their temporal condition.151
I attempted to turn away the attack against God’s omniscience, vis a vis His eternal
existence, in a different manner. Recall that the argument against God’s omniscience really
amounts to an argument against his omnipotence. It is said that God lacks omniscience, due to
His atemporality, because He does not know when events are occurring or have completed (ala
William Lane Craig (et. al.)).152 What I offered as a rejoinder to this objection is that the
objection is founded on a category mistake. Rather than positing God’s lack of experiencing that
it is currently 2:15 p.m. EST as a lack of knowledge, it ought to be said, instead, that He simply
knows that it is currently 2:15 p.m. EST for J.T. Turner (and all other temporal individuals in the
Eastern Standard Time Zone). God knows this fact by virtue of His knowing all facts that do not
require a first-person experiential knowledge. He simply does not have the same experiential
knowledge of time as a temporal entity does. The conclusion is the same as it would be for a
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defense of omniscience simpliciter against the charge that God does not know everything since
He does not know first-person facts (e.g. “I am hungry”). Put more simply, this is not a lack of
knowledge, this is simply a lack of know-how, not knowledge-that.153 It seems clear, then, that
God’s omniscience is in no way affected by his atemporal existence. The same, I think, can be
said with respect to God’s personhood – His being a Person. We need not think that God’s being
a Person, or His ability to relate to humans personally, is at all affected by His omniscience.154
With respect to God’s immutability, we saw earlier that Craig finds it obvious that, if
God has knowledge of changing individuals, then by virtue of their changing God’s noetic
content He also changes.155 It has been demonstrated, however, that the objection is false. The
objection is false because it hangs on the belief that extrinsic change to God is still change.156
But, that does not seem to be true at all. Remember that if God, on the ET-simultaneity view, is
viewing the whole of both the temporal landscape and eternal landscape without succession, it
must follow that while God knows that a contingent being changes, His knowledge of that
individual remains whole and does not change. In other words, the countless changes that a
contingent entity goes through are seen, in their totality, in the who she is that God knows. This
totality of who she is includes her particulars and the specific points in time that the temporal
entity changes.
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Possibility and actuality need not be undermined here. If possibility and actuality, with
respect to human beings, still actually occurs in time – and it does – then God still knows that a
person has both possibility and actuality in time. In addition to God’s relation to a human’s
possibility and actuality, there are also instances of God’s possibility and actuality (e.g. God’s
choosing world W over World W*). What I wish to say, on this point, is that God’s possibility
and actuality are not temporal but are, instead, logical.157 If that is the case, then God’s
“choosing world W over world W*, for example, is done atemporally.
Similarly, the arguments insisting that God’s atemporality affects His ability to act in
time (by Pike, for example), have been countered by means of a clarification (via ETsimultaneity) which insists that causes and effects need not both be in time. The suggestion we
made was that it is quite plausible that an eternal cause can have a temporal effect. Recall that
Pike’s argument starts off on the wrong footing by assuming a priori that events must have either
temporal causes, or events must have simultaneous causes.158 To counter Pike, I argued, using
Stump and Kretzmann’s ET-simultaneity argument, that if Pike is asserting that temporal effects
must have temporal causes, he makes no argument for it and simply assumes its truth. If Pike
argues the that events must have simultaneous causes, then God’s being ET-simultaneous to all
temporal events from the eternal reference frame fulfills the need for a simultaneous cause to a
temporal effect.159
The objection concerning God’s omnipresence with respect to His atemporality has – as
La Croix has stated it – also been defeated. This objection, as we saw, was simply a case of
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misunderstanding. In particular, the objection mistook what a theologian means when he
discusses omnipresence. As I argued in chapter three, ‘omnipresence’ does not mean a literal
spatial filling of God’s existence in a particular place; rather, ‘omnipresence’ must be understood
analogically because the theist asserts that God is upholding every spatial location by the power
of His will and being.
Lastly, with respect to the truth of premise (PR1), the discussion of Christ is brought to
the fore. Scripture clearly indicates that Christ did, in fact, come into time (Gal 4:4) and in Him
God’s deity is pleased to dwell in full (Col 1:19). Is it then not the case that God, as incarnate,
becomes temporal and, therefore, not immutable or atemporal? I take it that the short answer to
this question is “no.” It seems to me that taking the dual nature of Christ seriously requires the
atemporalist Christian to take seriously the idea that, while Jesus Christ was on this earth, God,
while eternal in His deity, was temporal in His humanity. Now (after Christ’s resurrection), if
what I have argued to this point is true, we can say that God is eternal in His deity and is
æviternal in His humanity. In exactly the same way that it is required for the Christian to take
seriously the idea that Christ was tempted in His humanity but cannot be tempted in His divinity,
the Christian must take seriously the idea that God was temporal (now is æviternal) in His
humanity and is eternal in His divinity. Granted, finite beings may never understand exactly
how all of that works out, but, perhaps, finite beings are not meant to.
With (PR1) and (PR2) accounted for, and (PR3) and (PR4) obviously true if the
resurrection is true, it is now time to revisit (PR5) and (PR6) to see if they are true as well.
(PR5) states:
(PR5): Any entity that God is present to and has consciousness, experiences the
“nowness” of God
while (PR6) says:
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(PR6): It is possible that, though dead on this earth, a person continues on in conscious
existence.
Essentially, these premises allow for the idea of æviternal existence. They do this first by
asserting that if God is present to a conscious entity, then that conscious entity experiences it.
This is not to say that the entity is necessarily cognizant of this fact, but the entity still
experiences the “nowness” of God at least subconsciously. This seems to be what the Apostle
Paul is implying in Romans chapter 1.160 However, with respect to the argument at hand, the
reality of God’s being present to someone, and her experiencing the “nowness” of God allows
for æviternal existence, and (SR) in the following way. It seems plausible, given what we have
said thus far, that experiencing the “nowness” of God after death takes a person from
experiencing God in her temporal being, to experiencing God on a higher level, or at least, on
another plane of being.
If it is the case that human beings, post resurrection, are non posse pecarri, as traditional
Christian theism believes, then it follows that at least something about their being is unable to
change.161 Such is the crux of (PR7) – (PR8). Depending on how one reads I Corinthians 15 and
II Corinthians 5, it is plausible to suppose that the “new creation” that is being sanctified (and is
ultimately “raised imperishable”) points toward a condition whereby the human’s natural being
is no longer subject to change yet still allows for the affections and intellect to be subject to
change. If these conditions are met, they fill the necessary conditions of Aquinas’s notion of
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æviternity, and allow for æviternal beings, the proposition made by (PR9).162 If it is the case that
æviternal existence includes a share of God’s eternity, and thereby some sense of His ETsimultaneity with temporal events (as I argued last chapter), then it is probably that (PR10) is
true.
If all of the above holds, then so does the argument for Simultaneous Resurrection. We
have seen that the formal argument for SR is logically valid; hopefully, we can now see that the
argument is sound, as well. This is wholly different than claiming that the argument for
Simultaneous Resurrection eases the struggle of thinking through what an ET-simultaneous
event (like the death and resurrection of an individual) might look like. However, SR at least
allows for the hope that what awaits the believer, upon death, is not some ethereal existence, but
rather a more perfect version of the current existence that human beings now have. Perfected
earthly existence seems to be what the New Testament is talking about: Heaven instantiated
simply and magnificently as a new earth containing, among other things, physically resurrected
bodies. If added to this understanding of the New Testament is the theory of Simultaneous
Resurrection, then we have a new and perhaps clearer understanding of what Jesus meant when
He told the robber on the cross: “Truly I say to you, today you will be with me in Paradise.”163
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APPENDIX

(LAD) and Temporary Bodies
Given the extraordinary nature of (LAD), it is possible that some may still have questions
regarding the type of existence that is included in a life “in its fullness and perfected.” In
particular, these hypothetical questions may be motivated by confusion on just why a human
being’s having a numerically identical body to that which was laid in the grave is a necessary
condition to their experiencing Paradise. The definition of (LAD) is quite simply “the sort of
paradisiacal state in which life is at its fullness and perfected.” This definition harks back to
Jesus’ promise to the robber on the cross that “today you will be with me in paradise.”164
It seems to me Paradise is something that, at least normally speaking, is not improvable.
That said, if, indeed, Paradise can be improved, it seems odd that such improvement would be of
a qualitative degree, including a drastic shift from disembodied existence to embodied existence.
Further, if paradise can be had without a body, then resurrection seems superfluous (as I say in
chapter four). At the very least, physical resurrection would not qualitatively matter enough to
receive the kind of importance Paul gives it in 1 Corinthians 15.
In sum, I suppose it can suffice that if Paradise can be had prior to (LAD), then I am not
at all sure it matters whether there is a physically resurrected existence. I do not see that it would
matter to me, or most humans, when given the choice between one stage of paradise and some
other second stage – one that does not seem, given the nature of a Paradise A/Paradise B
distinction, qualitatively much better. If it is the case that resurrection life is not dramatically
164
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better than not being resurrected, why the fuss over the physical resurrection of human persons in
Christianity? I think it is intuitive to us as Christians that the physical resurrection of humans is
of vital qualitative importance.
The above may answer questions regarding why a physical body is necessary in Paradise,
but it does not answer why a person would need a numerically identical body to the one in which
they lived their earthly life. Why not allow for a temporary embodiment? Why not say that a
person receives a temporary body between death and resurrection?
These questions have merit, but prima facie the overall idea of temporary embodiment
seems to lack explanatory power for nearly every question I have addressed in this paper. It also
seems like a wholly wasted move. What is the purpose of temporary bodies when bodies
numerically identical to the ones we have now are essentially part of our identity?
Further, if all corporeal things also have location, then this follows: even if there were
some odd intermediary state between death and resurrection, and we had temporary bodies, then
we would also find ourselves in some actual temporary location. Would that be like a prerecreated new Earth? What would that be? Again, such an idea seems like a wasted move on
God’s part. Why not just say that the resurrection of persons is a finished event for those who
are already dead and that they are in their resurrected, numerically identical bodies finding the
fullness of their identity in the recreated world? Having a “loaner” body in some “green-room”
of a world seems very odd and I do not see how the idea is helpful.

Causality?
In Chapter Three I spend time defending the idea that God’s atemporal action is an
atemporal cause that can and does have temporal effects. However, does this mean that a
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person’s temporal actions can have æviternal effects? In other words, if Jones makes a decision
in the temporal world, can it have an effect that is realized in an atemporal mode of existence
(e.g. temporal decisions that lead to finding oneself in (LAD))?
I do want to affirm that Jones’s decision toward Jesus has some effect eschatologically.
However, I also affirm Supralapsarianism in that God’s decree of election logically precedes His
decree of the Fall. So it may be said that God causes Jones to be saved. I also hold that God is
the one who moves Jones to the position of salvation; it is not at all of Jones’s doing, not even
the faith it takes to believe. God gives the faith, God moves Jones’s heart, God puts the thought
in his mind, and God makes Jones assent to the fact that Jesus is Lord.
If this is the case, then God really is the efficient cause of Jones’s salvation. Jones’s
participation in his “decision” would be more like a pencil’s participation in the writing of an
author. There is some degree of efficient causation, perhaps, in man, but not much and perhaps
only as illusory (at least with respect to salvation). So, here we have God’s atemporal will
atemporally deciding for Jones as the atemporal cause(s) that produces an atemporal effect, that
is, what ends up making Jones æviternal.

Mystical Experience and Substance Dualism
In II Corinthians chapter twelve verses 1 through 4, Paul describes a time when he was
“caught up to the third heaven.”165 The interesting thing about this instance is that he cannot
remember if he was “in the body or out of the body.”166 Since this is the case, it may be that the
substance dualist will read this passage as affirming an “out of body experience” or something
similar. Since a substance dualist affirms that a person can have consciousness apart from the
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body, they can reasonably assert that Paul must have been present with God in spirit while his
(dead) body was still on earth. So, they might claim, mystical experiences like Paul’s are much
better explained by substance dualism.
I am not sure why this must follow. First, when we speak of mystical experiences, is it
not possible to interpret them as visions and dreams, rather than literal moves from one type of
existence to another? Is it not possible that Paul, in this temporal world with his temporal body,
has a vision of the third heaven, or any other such experience, without having to be anywhere but
right where he is? I take it that if he were actually transported to Paradise, then it was in his
body. I also take it that God, by miracle, could have moved Paul from temporal existence to
æviternal existence, and back. I am not sure why God could not do that.
Second, and I think more probably, I find it is actually better to read this passage as Paul
having a vision. I think it is underdetermined whether Paul was in some other “place,” or if he
was experiencing things like what Isaiah experienced in his visions of God’s glory filling the
temple in Isaiah 6:1. I take it those were visions. And visions, like dreams, do not actually take
anyone anywhere. When I have a dream I may experience things in my consciousness through
the firings of my brain, but I am not spatially displaced. I am still safe in my bed. I take it that
visions are simply dreams while someone is awake. If we were to posit a view whereby when
dreaming or having a vision our soul leaves our body, then it seems that we might call visions
that cause a metaphysical displacement of one’s soul as “soul-snatching.” That seems absurd.
I do not, for instance, believe that John the Revelator was actually taken up into Heaven
for his visions. I do, however, believe that Paul, John, and Isaiah truly did experience something.
Mystical experiences, visions, and dreams are all relatively similar.

82

(PR3): Is Jones’s Death an Event for Jones?
When I write that Jones’s death and resurrection are events (in (PR3)), I mean Jones’s
death and resurrection are events in two different perspectives. First, Jones’s death is an event
for people other than Jones in that they experience his death. Suppose Jones has a relative,
Smith. I take it that Jones’s passing would be an event for Smith. However, I also take it that,
regardless of the truth of SR or not, when Smith’s loved one, Jones, resurrects and reflects back
on his earthly life, he will consider his death an event in his life. He may not have experienced it
(whereby “experienced” means “felt”), but it does not follow that it is not an event in the life of
Jones. I hold that the same would be the case for everyone. Death is a concrete thing that
happens to a person.
Similarly, I take it that Jones’s resurrection will be an event for both Jones and any third
party onlooker in the conventional way. Most likely, Jones will realize that he is resurrecting
(or, as part of his experiential manifold, he will have the experience of resurrection whether or
not he experiences it in the same type of temporal progression we currently find normative).

(PR8): Further Exposition on “Natural Being” and Being “Subject to Change.”
“Natural being” is explained by rewording Thomas Aquinas’s definition of the æviternal
being.167 I explain this initially on page 34 but more thoroughly on pages 59 and 76 (with
regards to their unchanging relational condition with God). In other words, an æviternal being’s
“natural being” is formed and completed on the basis of his or her relationship with the person of
God. A person’s natural being prior to a perfected relationship with God is not only subject to
change, but it is subject to sin. If this is the case, I take it that, with completed sanctification and
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glorification (and so the eradication of sin), a person’s relationship with God will not change;
rather, it will be perfected at death in transition to the after-life. This perfection is the only way
that human being will be able to commune with God perfectly with an unveiled face.
Regarding the word “natural,” I am merely using the term that Aquinas uses.168 As I read
Thomas, it appears that what he means by “natural” is simply a modifier to “being” the way we
might use the word “core” now (e.g. core being). Theologically we may use “nature” to describe
a predisposition. We might say that if someone has a “sin nature”, then that someone is
predisposed to sin. Sin is, in some sense, “easy” and “fitting” for them to do. Natural being,
then, is similar. It is how a person is in their predispositions.
The idea behind the expression “not being subject to change” is addressed on page 59.
Again, this language is found in ST. Aquinas explains that an æviternal entity is not essentially a
changing being but can have change annexed to it from the outside (e.g. by God). In my
estimation, æviternal existence is an appropriate measure for resurrected human beings since
their being/essence will, at the point of death, be to not change. That is, their being and essence
will be perfectly subjected to the unchanging will of God, in an unchanging perfected
relationship. Change can be annexed to the human being by God with respect to affections and
movements.169
Following from this, I take it that “free will” in resurrection life will be the true freedom
we find described in Scripture: slavery to God’s Spirit and will. An æviternal person will not be
making the decisions in and of themselves; rather, the person will be 100 percent dependent and
motivated/moved by the Spirit. This is how God annexes change to an æviternal being.
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Completed sanctification and glorification170 require atemporality because they define a
person’s being in such a way that their being (i.e. their relational status with God) is no longer
changing. The core of who they are, at the moment of glorification, is no longer defined by the
ebb and flow of the struggle of sin. God’s will, at resurrection, takes over the æviternal person’s
will. As Christ prays in John 17, Christians will be one with the community of the Kingdom of
God (i.e. the Church) and with God Himself even as the Father and Son are one.171 As I take it,
it will not be exactly as they are one, since Christian human beings will not be God (obviously),
but we will have an incredible unchanging unity with God.
If time is the measure of things that change (and, perhaps further than that, things that are
essentially changing) then it stands to reason that another unit of measure is needed to measure
those things that are not eternal, can have changed annex (applied) to them, and are essentially
unchanging beings.172 That unit of measure is the atemporal measure of æviternity. Throughout
this project I am not reifying æviternity, time, or eternity. They are simply units of measure to
describe types of change or non-change. If a human being’s being, essence, and natural being
will be defined in the resurrection by the unchanging nature of their relationship with God, then
it seems like another unit is needed to measure those bits of annexed change that can (and
probably will) happen in the resurrected existence. I find my distinctions on page 66 helpful on
this point. If we have unchanging holiness (sanctification) and unchanging glory (glorification),
and those two things describe the core of who we are in the resurrection, then it seems that the
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core of who we are does not change and cannot be, therefore, measured by time; hence,
æviternity.

Is Æviternity Durative?
I would say the experience of the human resurrected person will have something like
duration, but atemporally linear duration. Again, I do not believe that seconds or hours or
minutes are things – they are measures of something that will not be the primary measure of
existence in the resurrected world. I also do not see why duration or linear existence must be
measured by time. Certainly it will have, as Aquinas says of æviternity, a “compatibility” with
time.173 As I take it, Aquinas means that it will not be wholly untimelike in the way that tota
simul existence is.174 Perhaps the duration will be largely phenomenological duration.
If we want to use a crude example, think of a dream state. In a dream it may be that a
person participates in events for what seems like long periods of time. Days even. However,
upon waking, the dreamer typically realizes they have only been asleep for a matter of minutes.
I do not suppose that the linear progression of the dream and the phenomenological “feel” of the
dream are less “real” to the person experiencing the dream. Nor do I assume that the actual
events in the dream can be measured by time. I would say it is quite possible that our resurrected
state could be somewhat like that in the sense that it feels like linear progression and duration,
but not in anything we can accurately measure by time. That would be a category mistake.
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Is God Present to States or Concrete Events?
In (PR2), (PR3), and (PR5) the expression “God is present to” is either stated explicitly
(as in (PR5)) or implicitly (as in (PR2) and (PR3)).175 The question that might be asked of these
three premises is: “how can an atemporal/eternal God be “present” to anything?” Can He be
present to temporal concrete events and entities or is He just present to states of affairs? There
seems to be a dis-analogy between how humans experience events and how God does.
For this objection, let it be the case that some x that is concrete at time t in manner m
cannot also be non-concrete at time t in manner m. If this is the case, and I believe it is, the
objection might be stated like this: If some person, Martin (in space-time), is present to some
concrete x, Martin, Jr. (in space-time), then God cannot be present to one or both of them unless
he can be present to concrete beings.
While I do agree if some x is concrete at time t in manner m then it cannot be abstract at
time t in manner m, I do not see how it follows that God cannot be present to, in a relational
sense, a concrete temporal being (e.g. Martin and Martin, Jr.). I do, of course, argue that He is
not literally “there,” as if God had “whereness,” on pages 49 and 50 in particular. Of course God
does not have literal spatio-temporal location, but from that it does not follow that He cannot be
“present to,” in a relational sense, a concrete temporal being. All I mean by “present to” is that
God experiences a concrete temporal person, Jones, at every temporal moment.
Again, time is not reified. Time does not have ontological status. God experiences a
person’s temporal moments in one static instant altogether. Of course this will be in a much
different way than Martin experiences Martin, Jr. or is present to Martin, Jr. When we say
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“present to” referencing a temporal individual, we mean present in both the “now of time” sense
as well as a relational sense. When speaking of God as “present,” I simply mean to say a similar
thing that we mean by “omnipresent.” I do not mean a literal spatial “thereness,” but, rather,
God’s relationship with the concrete being (manifested largely in the temporal effect of His
atemporal will to uphold the individual).

Why Were Adam and Eve Not Æviternal?
Perhaps, given that I am not an expert theologian, this question may be beyond my ken
because it assumes an expertise in the teleology of Adam and Eve in the Edenic state. However,
I actually reject the interpretation of Genesis 1-2 that Adam and Eve were teleologically fulfilled.
I do not believe man was teleologically fulfilled in the Edenic state prior to The Fall. Again, I
affirm Supralapsarianism and that man was always intended to fall, and that if it had not been the
case that God designed man and creation to fall, it would not have fallen. Only in the case of
being not able to sin would Adam have been teleologically fulfilled. I find that because he did
indeed fall, he was not fulfilled nor could he have been. Those who are fulfilled do not fall to
temptation (hence the second Adam, Jesus Christ, is completely fulfilled teleologically in His
divinity and His humanity and thus could and would not fall).
Adam and Eve, I believe, were essentially changing beings and were thus measured by
time in the Garden. They were not glorified and not ratified in sanctification. Innocent, perhaps.
Sanctified in the way Christians will be sanctified in the resurrection? No. We might even want
to say something like this with respect to the Edenic state: in the Garden it was possible for
man’s relationship with God to change. This possibility for the change of their core relationship
is perhaps sufficient for a living being to be measured by time. In the resurrection, however, it
will be impossible for man to change his relationship with God. It is possible that this
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unchanging relationship is a sufficient condition for a living being to be atemporal, without being
a sufficient condition for æviternity (though it would be a necessary condition for æviternity).
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